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1905 
SAFEGUARDING WASHINGTON’S TRADE SECRETS: 
PROTECTING BUSINESSES FROM PUBLIC RECORDS 
REQUESTS 
John Delaney* 
Abstract: Lawmakers constantly balance competing interests. They decide where to draw 
lines so that societal goals are accomplished without ignoring the needs of those who will be 
affected by their choices. The Washington State Legislature is now in the process of 
addressing the line between government transparency and the protection of private 
companies’ trade secrets. Companies who provide technology to the federal government are 
susceptible to losing their trade secrets through a public records request. The Washington 
State Legislature is currently reviewing the trade secret exception to the Public Records Act 
to ensure it is continuing to protect companies from losing their trade secrets. This Comment 
will both address the dangers companies face and evaluate the current proposals to change 
the law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Scholars consider transparency in government to be essential for the 
proper functioning of a modern-day democracy. Likewise, most voters 
uphold and respect transparency as the embodiment of “government of 
the people, by the people, for the people.”1 For example, the opening 
passage of the Washington State Public Records Act (PRA) proudly 
proclaims: 
The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the 
agencies that serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do 
not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for 
the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The 
people insist on remaining informed so that they may maintain 
control over the instruments that they have created.2 
Even President Lyndon B. Johnson, who had serious doubts about the 
federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), signed it into law and 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2018. I would like to thank 
Professor Gomulkiewicz for his invaluable guidance and input. I would also like to thank the stellar 
team at Washington Law Review, without which this piece would not exist. 
1. Abraham Lincoln, President of the U.S., The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), 
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm [https://perma.cc/SJ78- 
BMCP]. 
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2016). 
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declared that he was deeply proud that the “United States is an open 
society.”3 
However, even though we value transparency, some types of 
information should remain secret. The most common justification for 
secrecy is national security.4 However, there is another significant 
interest that demands that some information collected by the government 
be withheld from public disclosure: trade secrets. Companies have 
always disclosed pricing information. But now they disclose much more 
valuable information like drone schematics, body camera technology, 
and software source code and data.5 Companies that provide goods and 
services to the government have a significant interest in protecting their 
trade secrets from exposure. In the event of the exposure of trade secrets, 
government contractors stand to lose any advantage their confidential 
information gives them over their competitors. A policy that allows for 
the over-exposure of trade secrets would, in all likelihood, result in 
significant harm to both large and small companies. 
As valuable intellectual property assets, trade secrets are legally 
protected because they are not “generally known” or “ascertainable.”6 
                                                     
3. Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the U.S., Statement by the President Upon Signing S. 1160 
(July 4, 1966), http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//nsa/foia/FOIARelease66.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP88-
GXRM]. 
4. See, e.g., id. (“I have always believed that freedom of information is so vital that only the 
national security . . . should determine when it must be restricted.”). 
5. For example, on the national stage, one of the largest fights in the battle between protecting 
company trade secrets and government transparency involves the litigation surrounding the 
“fracking” practices of drilling companies that seek to mine oil and natural gas. See John Craven, 
Note, Fracking Secrets: The Limitations of Trade Secret Protection in Hydraulic Fracturing, 16 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 395 (2014). The risk of the chemicals that are used in fracking getting 
into the groundwater has caused a general outcry, with people becoming concerned about the 
potential adverse effects to human health. John D. Furlow & John R. Hays, Jr., Disclosure with 
Protection of Trade Secrets Comes to the Hydraulic Fracturing Revolution, 7 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & 
ENERGY L. 289, 296 (2011) (“[n]otwithstanding the current outcry . . . alleging risks to water 
supply . . .”). Drilling companies can invest millions of dollars in researching and developing the 
“recipes” for these so-called “fracking fluids.” See id. at 306 (“Energy companies have invested 
millions of dollars into research to develop formulas specifically tailored to different [geological] 
formations . . . .”); Mike Soraghan, Hydraulic Fracking: Two-Thirds of Frack Disclosures Omit 
‘Secrets’, E&E NEWS.COM (Sept. 26, 2012), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1059970474 
[https://perma.cc/DPQ4-GFKL]. These companies claim that disclosing these formulas would 
provide their competitors with an unfair competitive advantage. Furlow & Hayes, supra, at 306; 
Craven, supra, at 401 (“Forcing disclosure of those ‘secret recipes’ would produce a windfall for 
other companies and cost the disclosing company much of the economic advantage that its research 
produced.”). However, the public also has a great interest in gaining access to information that is 
essential to evaluate health risks and determine the appropriate steps to ensure their safety. See 
Craven, supra, at 404. The balancing between the governmental interest in protection of trade 
secrets and the interest in transparency sharply overhangs this issue. 
6. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) [hereinafter UTSA]. 
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Thus, maintaining their secrecy is essential. Companies will go to great 
lengths to prevent people from finding out their trade secrets because 
keeping them secret gives them an advantage over their competitors. In 
fact, taking reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy is one of the 
fundamental tenets of the very definition of trade secrets.7 Losing trade 
secrets could be devastating for a business and incredibly lucrative for 
their competitors. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the vast majority of public records 
requests are made by businesses, not ordinary private citizens or news 
media outlets.8 Any information businesses submit to the government as 
part of the contract bidding process or through an ongoing relationship 
with the government can end up in the hands of a competitor.9 
As state governments procure more and more complicated 
technologies, concern over protecting the associated trade secrets has 
become more acute. For example, two exciting new areas of government 
procurement are drones and body cameras. By 2013, approximately 
twenty-five state and local law enforcement agencies either had applied 
for the Federal Aviation Administration’s drone authorization program 
or had borrowed Customs and Border Protection drones.10 The number 
of state police forces using drones can only be expected to increase as 
drones change and improve the way the police operate,11 with other 
public entities not far behind.12 
                                                     
7. Id. § 1(4)(ii).  
8. Daniel B. Goldman, (Trade) Secrets, Secrets Are No Fun—Especially When Disclosed 
Through FOIA Requests to Everyone, 3 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 690, 710 (2008) (referencing studies of 
FOIA requests); Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1380 (2016) (noting that at 
the SEC, FDA, EPA, and DLA “commercial requests represent the overwhelming majority of all 
requests received”). Professor Kwoka also reveals evidence that a “cottage industry” has emerged 
based on FOIA requesting. Kwoka, supra, at 1380. At five of the six agencies that she studied, 
“some of the highest-volume requesters are companies whose business model is to request federal 
records under FOIA and resell those very records for a profit” and that, “by contrast, the relative 
paucity of news media requests is apparent across the board.” Id. at 1381; see also id. at 1382–414 
(breaking down the data of FOIA requestors for six large government agencies).  
9. Kwoka, supra note 8. 
10. Law Enforcement Agencies Using Drones List, Map, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com 
/gov-data/safety-justice/drones-state-local-law-enforcement-agencies-license-list.html 
[https://perma.cc/F3VM-2E9Y] (last updated 2013). 
11. Matt Alderton, To the Rescue! Why Drones in Police Work Are the Future of Crime Fighting, 
AUTODESK: REDSHIFT (Apr. 30, 2015), https://redshift.autodesk.com/drones-in-police-work-future-
crime-fighting/ [https://perma.cc/C59U-JKWD] (listing hostage negotiation, bomb investigation, 
missing persons, crime surveillance and pursuit, drug interdiction, and crime scene analysis as some 
of areas in which police work will be improved by drones). 
12. Already, it is more than only state and local law enforcement agencies that are using drones. 
See generally ASS’N OF GOVERNMENTAL RISK POOLS & NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, RISK INFO. 
SHARING CONSORTIUM, USE AND REGULATION OF DRONES BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENTITIES & 
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Washington State is no different. Both the Seattle Police 
Department13 and the King County Sheriff’s Office applied for the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s drone program by 2013.14 During the 
summer of 2016, the Renton Police Department began using drones to 
help investigate crimes and serious accidents.15 Moreover, several other 
agencies in the greater Seattle area are looking into using drones as 
well.16 
As in the case with drones, state and local law enforcement agencies 
are also ramping up their usage of body cameras.17 In 2013, only about 
25% of police departments around the country were using body 
cameras.18 Now, 95% of surveyed police departments have committed to 
body camera usage or have already implemented body camera 
programs.19 The manager of the Seattle Police Department’s own body 
camera program, Nick Zajchowski, has said that the plan is to equip 850 
officers with the cameras by the fall of 2017.20 
In order to keep up with the increase in the complexity of technology, 
state governments—including Washington State—need to get more 
sophisticated about the procurement process and how they are 
safeguarding the trade secrets of the companies from which they obtain 
their technology. The breadth of information that could now be exposed 
                                                     
SCHOOLS: THOUGHTS FOR PUBLIC ENTITY POOLS (2015), http://www.agrip.org/assets/1/6/Drones 
IssueAnalysisJuly2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9DV-L93R]. Local public entities, “including local 
governments and schools,” are expressing interest in a variety of uses for drones, like inspecting 
infrastructure, filming and photographing events, and property inspections and appraisals. Id. at 2. 
13. Law Enforcement Agencies Using Drones List, Map, supra note 10. 
14. 2011–2012 FAA List of Drone License Applicants, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/document/2012-faa-list-drone-applicants [https://perma.cc/F745-C5EH]. 
15. Andrew Padula, Renton Police Dept. Becomes First in State To Use Drones To Investigate 
Crimes, Crash Scenes, Q13 FOX NEWS (Aug. 3, 2016, 5:11 PM), http://q13fox.com/2016/08/03/ 
renton-police-using-drones-to-investigate-crime-crash-scenes/ [https://perma.cc/Z76R-H73N]. 
16. Id. Furthermore, “several [Washington State] agencies—including the Department of 
Transportation, the Department of Fish and Wildlife, and the Department of Ecology—are 
finalizing a model drone policy.” Drew Atkins, Washington: The “Wild West” for Surveillance 
Drones, CROSSCUT (Apr. 19, 2016), http://crosscut.com/2016/04/washington-the-wild-west-for-
surveillance-drones/ [https://perma.cc/3A58-T4ML]. 
17. Mike Maciag, Survey: Almost All Police Departments Plan To Use Body Cameras, 
GOVERNING (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-police-
body-camera-survey.html [https://perma.cc/P2EZ-A672]. 
18. Police Body Camera Use in the United States, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Police_ 
body_camera_use_in_the_United_States#tab=Background [https://perma.cc/8YXE-VEDH]. 
19. Maciag, supra note 17.  
20. Jessica Lee, Police Body Cams To Add ‘Another Layer’ of Evidence, Issues for Seattle 
Officials, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 4, 2016), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/police-body-
cams-to-add-another-layer-of-evidence-issues-for-seattle-officials/ [https://perma.cc/8YXE-VEDH]. 
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by transparency presents a difficult question for states: when does trade 
secret information need to be available for public review and when does 
it need to be kept secret? For example, it might be more important to 
ensure that software, source code, and data associated with the voting 
process are open to the public21 but not as important for the drone 
technology. Another example is that it might be more important to 
protect the body camera data than it is to protect the body camera 
software. Moreover, even in the cases when transparency is the chosen 
path there are often practical, implementation problems achieving that 
goal.22 Thus, more complex technology raises important questions about 
balancing when it might be more important and safer for companies to 
ensure that the trade secrets associated with certain goods and services 
are protected from public disclosure versus when government 
transparency is more important. 
The quintessential symbols of government transparency are public 
records acts. Every state has a public records act, most of which are 
patterned after the broad “any person,” “any record”23 language of 
FOIA.24 Therefore, in most states, any person can make a public records 
request and any agency document is subject to public disclosure upon 
receipt of such a request.25 Moreover, Washington State has an 
                                                     
21. See, e.g., R. James Woolsey & Brian J. Fox, To Protect Voting, Use Open-Source Software, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/opinion/open-source-software-
hacker-voting.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/4SM7-WJMA] (discussing the added security 
benefits of open-source software, precisely because everyone can see how it operates). 
22. For example, in the case of police body camera footage, the best interests of the public are in 
making that footage available when requested. But there have been problems with implementing 
that transparency goal. Take the example of Tim Clemans, a Seattle man who made blanket requests 
for every dash-cam and body-cam video generated by the Seattle Police Department (SPD). Jennifer 
Sullivan, Seattle Police Tech Officer Quits, Criticizes Department, DIGITAL COMTYS. (Oct. 30, 
2015), http://www.govtech.com/dc/articles/Seattle-Police-Tech-Officer-Quits-Criticizes- 
Department.html [https://perma.cc/3B53-6CFS]. The sheer volume of the requests made it 
practically impossible for the SPD to fulfill and threatened the implementation of the Seattle Police 
Department’s budding body-cam program. See Steve Miletich & Jennifer Sullivan, Costly Public-
Records Requests May Threaten SPD Plan for Body Cameras, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/costly-public-records-requests-may-threaten-spd-plan-
for-body-cameras/ [https://perma.cc/M7N8-HGRD]. The amount of time that would have needed to 
be spent (it can take thirty minutes to edit a twenty-seven second video) and the amount of money it 
would have cost (agencies can charge for making copies, but not for other staff time, i.e., paying 
people to spend hours editing would have to come out of an agencies’ budget) almost caused the 
Seattle Police Department to cancel the body-cam program altogether. Id.  
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (3)(A)–(B) (2012). 
24. State Public Record Laws, FOIADVOCATES, http://foiadvocates.com/records.html 
[https://perma.cc/G9N6-W6YT]. 
25. Goldman, supra note 8, at 709. 
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incredibly broad public records act.26 Couple that with an extremely pro-
public records state Supreme Court27 and the result is a state where 
government transparency has a long reach and significant power.28 
Washington State has already taken steps to protect trade secret 
information from public records requests. Courts have generally read a 
trade secret exemption into the PRA.29 The statute contains language 
such that records that fit within a specified exemption defined by PRA or 
any “other statute” are protected from disclosure.30 This “other statute” 
language has been interpreted to include the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
as adopted by Washington State.31 Thus, trade secrets are generally 
exempt from disclosure by a public records request.32 
However, the existence of this exemption does not mean that 
companies are in the clear. The “other statute” language is buried within 
the statute and does not expressly state that trade secrets are exempted.33 
In addition, PRA contains another provision that generally exempts 
“financial, commercial and proprietary information.”34 This section 
contains twenty-seven subsections, all of which discuss information that 
could qualify under the broad definition of trade secrets.35 The confusion 
generated by the hidden “other statute” language and the ambiguous 
                                                     
26. Nissen v. Pierce County, 183 Wash. 2d 863, 874, 357 P.3d 45, 52 (2015) (“As we so often 
summarize, the PRA ‘is a strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of public records.’” 
(internal citations omitted) (citing Yakima County v. Yakima Herald–Republic, 170 Wash. 2d 775, 
791, 246 P.3d 768 (2011))). 
27. O’Neill v. City of Shoreline, 170 Wash. 2d 138, 147, 240 P.3d 1149, 1154 (2010) (“Our 
broad PRA exists to ensure that the public maintains control over their government, and we will not 
deny our citizenry access to a whole class of possibly important government information.”). 
28. Nissen, 183 Wash. 2d at 874, 357 P.3d at 52 (proclaiming that the PRA “is a strongly worded 
mandate for broad disclosure of public records” (quoting Yakima Herald–Republic, 170 Wash. 2d at 
791, 246 P.3d 768 at 775)); see also, e.g., Belenski v. Jefferson County, 187 Wash. App. 724, 733, 
350 P.3d 689, 694 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (“The statute’s language ‘reflects the belief that the sound 
governance of a free society demands that the public have full access to information concerning the 
workings of the government.’ Accordingly, courts must avoid interpreting the PRA in a way that 
would tend to frustrate that purpose.” (quoting Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 Wash. 2d 25, 31, 929 
P.2d 389 (1997))), rev’d in part, 186 Wash. 2d 452, 378 P.3d 176 (2016). 
29. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 262, 884 P.2d 592, 
603 (1994). 
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2016) (emphasis added). 
31. Progressive Animal, 125 Wash. 2d at 262, 884 P.2d at 603. 
32. See generally id. (recognizing a trade secret exemption to PRA). 
33. Unlike the Freedom of Information Act, which clearly lists trade secrets among the 
exemptions to disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012). 
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270 (2016). 
35. Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 19.108.010(4) (2016) (incorporating the UTSA’s broad 
definition of trade secrets). 
08 - Delaney.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/18/2017 9:02 AM 
2017] SAFEGUARDING WASHINGTON’S TRADE SECRETS 1911 
 
section on “financial, commercial and proprietary information” makes it 
very hard for businesses to know that their trade secret information is 
exempted from a public records request. 
The legislative committee responsible for monitoring and updating 
these exemptions has recognized the problem and issued a proposal to 
fix it.36 The “Sunshine Committee” has suggested adding a subsection to 
the “financial, commercial and proprietary information” provision that 
specifically exempts “trade secrets as defined in RCW 19.108.010(4).”37 
Its stated goal is to help businesses submitting information to the 
government to recognize that their trade secrets are protected from 
disclosure.38 However, while a step in the right direction, this proposal 
does not accomplish that goal. 
This Comment will propose an amendment to Washington law to 
clarify the PRA, streamline the disclosure process for practicing lawyers, 
requestors, and disclosing agencies, and help businesses—especially 
small businesses—know their trade secrets are protected. The Comment 
proceeds with Part I, which provides a general overview of trade secret 
law. Part II then discusses the federal approach to trade secret 
exemption, embodied in FOIA. Part III provides an overview of the 
procurement framework in Washington, summarizes the public records 
act, as well as the trade secrets exemptions, and provides two examples 
of ambiguity in the case law. Part IV explains the various problems 
caused by the current exemption construction, analyzes the benefits and 
drawbacks of adopting the legislature’s proposed solution, and 
concludes by proposing a number of solutions, including renaming a key 
provision in the PRA to specify a clear trade secret exemption. 
I. OVERVIEW OF TRADE SECRET LAW 
United States intellectual property law protects four main categories 
of intellectual property: patents, trademarks, copyright, and trade 
secrets.39 Of these four categories, trade secrets are unique because their 
protection “may extend indefinitely, lasting as long as the subject matter 
                                                     
36. PUB. RECORDS EXEMPTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., STATE OF WASHINGTON 2016 
ANNUAL REPORT (2016), http://agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploadedfiles/Home/About_ 
the_Office/Open_Government/Sunshine_Committee/2016-Sunshine-Committee-Annual-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P62J-XJC7]. 
37. Id. at 10. 
38. Id. at 4–5.  
39. See ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 9.01 (2016); 
BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43714, PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS: OVERVIEW OF 
CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION 4 (2016). 
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of the trade secret . . . is kept confidential.”40 Thus, the primary 
requirement for trade secret protection is that trade secrets are secret.41 
A. History of Trade Secrets 
Trade secret law developed through the common law42 and is 
primarily controlled by state law.43 Unlike the other forms of intellectual 
property, trade secret protection was not developed until the mid-
nineteenth century.44 Trade secrets were first widely accepted as 
legitimate intellectual property holding value in 1939 when they were 
incorporated in the First Restatement of Torts.45 As described by the 
Restatement: 
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or 
compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and 
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a 
chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or 
preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or 
a list of customers.46 
This definition is generally considered to be very broad,47 
encompassing a wide array of information.48 Some of the most well-
known examples of trade secrets “include the formula for Coca-Cola, the 
recipe for Kentucky Fried Chicken, and the algorithm used by Google’s 
                                                     
40. YEH, supra note 39, at 3; MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 39, § 1.03. 
41. UTSA § 1(4)(i) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (noting that a trade secret gains its value from 
“not being generally known” and “not being readily ascertainable”). 
42. Goldman, supra note 8, at 699. 
43. See e.g., MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 39, § 1.01.2.vii (discussing the states’ adoption of 
the UTSA and the importance of uniformity). That is not to say that federal law on trade secrets is 
not influential. Recently President Obama signed the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), an 
amendment to the Economic Espionage Act. Peter J. Toren, The Defend Trade Secrets Act, INTELL. 
PROP. & TECH. L.J., July 2016, at 3. DTSA, among other things, provides federal civil remedies for 
misappropriation of trade secrets, a matter that was previously left exclusively to state law. Id. 
44. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 311, 316 (2008) (noting that “[t]he doctrine of trade secrets evolved out of a series of 
[nineteenth century] common law torts”). 
45. Goldman, supra note 8, at 690, 699. 
46. RESTATMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
47. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 8, at 699–700 (observing that courts have held “a bevy of 
nontechnical subject matter can qualify as trade secrets, including business pricing information, 
sales data, supplier capabilities, marketing plans, promotional materials, and even some religious 
texts,” and also discussing client lists and abstract ideas). 
48. See, e.g., YEH, supra note 39, at i. 
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search engine.”49 For something to become a trade secret it must meet 
minimal standards of novelty and inventiveness.50 The purpose of this 
requirement is to prevent extending protection to something that is 
generally or commonly known in a particular industry.51 Thus, the most 
important element of a trade secret is its secrecy;52 information that is 
publicly disclosed cannot be protected as a trade secret.53 
Although the broad nature of eligible subject matter makes it difficult 
to determine what qualifies as a trade secret,54 the First Restatement of 
Torts laid out six factors to consider in determining whether some 
particular subject matter is a trade secret. These factors are: 
(1) The extent to which the information is known outside of his 
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and 
others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken 
by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of 
the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of 
effort or money expended by him in developing the information; 
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be 
properly acquired or duplicated by others.55 
Applying these factors and determining what information constitutes 
a trade secret is a question of fact and therefore is resolved by a jury.56 
The First Restatement’s definition of trade secret and the six factors 
used to determine its existence were widely accepted by the courts.57 
But, the subject of trade secrets was omitted from the Second 
Restatement of Torts.58 This exclusion left several issues unaddressed, 
like the availability of injunctive relief and the statute of limitations.59 
                                                     
49. Id. 
50. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). 
51. Id. (“[S]ome novelty will be required if merely because that which does not possess novelty is 
usually known.”). 
52. Goldman, supra note 8, at 701 (“Of course, the single most important requirement for a trade 
secret is that it must actually be secret.” (emphasis in original)). 
53. Id. 
54. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (“An exact 
definition of a trade secret is not possible.”); see also Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys, 
Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 723 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A] trade secret ‘is one of the most elusive and difficult 
concepts in the law to define.’” (quoting Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 
288 (5th Cir. 1978))).  
55. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
56. MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 39, § 15.01. 
57. Goldman, supra note 8, at 702. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
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Fortunately, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws addressed this omission in 1979.60 The commissioners 
drafted and approved the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).61 The 
UTSA defines a trade secret as: 
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives 
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value 
from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that 
are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.62 
This description departs from the First Restatement of Torts definition 
in a number of ways,63 but the UTSA description retains the primary 
requirement of secrecy.64 The UTSA lays out four main elements that 
must be satisfied to justify trade secret protection.65 A trade secret must 
be (1) information; (2) that derives independent economic value; (3) 
from not being generally known or ascertainable by proper means from 
people who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and 
(4) is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.66 The UTSA 
proved to be wildly successful and was adopted in one form or another 
by forty-seven states, including Washington State.67 Since then, the 
UTSA has remained the prevailing definition of trade secrets.68 
                                                     
60. Id. at 703. 
61. Id.  
62. UTSA § 1(4)(i)–(ii) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
63. Goldman, supra note 8, at 703. 
64. UTSA § 1(4)(i) (noting that a trade secret gains its value from “not being generally known” 
and “not being readily ascertainable”). 
65. Id. § 1(4)(i)–(ii). 
66. Id. 
67. Legislative Fact Sheet—Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N., http://www.uniform 
laws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act [https://perma.cc/457G-CX 
QB]; see WASH. REV. CODE § 19.108 (2016) (Washington State’s codified version of the UTSA). 
68. In the aftermath of the UTSA, the topic of trade secrets has been reincorporated back into the 
Restatements, but this time in the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition. This Restatement 
revised the previous treatment from the First Restatement of Torts to match the new train of thought 
expressed by the UTSA. To that end, it omitted the determining six factors and focused more on the 
UTSA’s criteria of economic value and the secrecy of the information. Compare RESTATEMENT OF 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 39 reporter’s note cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (noting that “many cases rely on 
the factors identified in [the] Restatement of Torts” but not expressly adopting them). See also 
Goldman, supra note 8, at 704 (noting that “[t]he new treatment omitted the six factors” and that the 
Restatement “opt[ed] instead for a more holistic approach to relevant factors such as the monetary 
value of the purported trade secret, [and] the secrecy and definiteness of the information”). 
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On April 27, 2016, President Obama brought about the most recent 
federal development of trade secrets when he signed the Defend Trade 
Secrets Act (DTSA), which went in to effect on that same day.69 The 
main effect of the DTSA is that it provides civil remedies in federal 
court for misappropriation of trade secrets, an area that previously “was 
strictly a matter of state law.”70 To this end, it was enacted as an 
amendment to the Economic Espionage Act.71 The DTSA amends this 
Act’s definition of a trade secret to bring it “more in line with the 
UTSA,” keeping the traditional broad definition.72 The DTSA further 
follows the UTSA’s lead by only categorizing information as a trade 
secret if (1) the information is actually secret by virtue of not being 
generally knowable or properly ascertainable by a person who could 
obtain economic value from its use; (2) reasonable measures have been 
taken to maintain that secrecy; and (3) the information derives 
independent economic value from its secrecy.73 The DTSA does not 
“eliminate or preempt the various state trade secret rights,”74 and so the 
full scope of its effect on the states has not been fully explored yet. 
B. Destruction of Trade Secret Protection 
The main takeaway from the development of trade secret law is that 
information is only protectable as a trade secret if it is kept secret.75 
Trade secret protection can potentially last forever,76 but because “[a] 
trade secret is of value ‘only because it is a secret, and only so long as it 
remains a secret,’”77 once the secret gets out it can no longer be 
                                                     
69. Toren, supra note 43. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 4. 
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A)–(B) (2012); see also Toren, supra note 43, at 4. 
74. Toren, supra note 43, at 3. 
75. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A)–(B) (trade secrets gain value “from not being generally 
known . . . and not being readily ascertainable”); UTSA § 1(4)(i) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (trade 
secrets gain value “from not being generally known . . . and not being readily ascertainable”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“A trade secret is 
any information . . . that is sufficiently valuable and secret . . . .”); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (trade secrets give the owner “an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it”). 
76. MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 39, § 8.02[6] (noting that “trade secret protection is 
‘perpetual’ (i.e., of indeterminate duration) until the matter becomes generally known”); see also 
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (explaining that an inventor 
can “keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely”). 
77. LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS 
AND MONOPOLIES § 14:27 (4th ed. 2017).  
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protected.78 
This requirement of secrecy, however, seems to conflict with the 
functioning of the American workplace. After all, trade secrets are used 
every day in organizations that can potentially employ thousands of 
employees.79 Furthermore, employees are continuously moving from 
company to company, often working for a competitor of a former 
employer.80 Thus, using a trade secret to maximize a company’s profit 
often requires confiding that secret to other parties.81 To reconcile the 
legal requirement of secrecy with the practical reality of the frequent 
disclosure of trade secrets to necessary parties, courts will uphold trade 
secret protection as long as a trade secret owner takes “reasonable 
measures” to maintain secrecy.82 Essentially, courts will look at the 
entirety of the circumstances surrounding the use of a trade secret to 
determine whether secrecy has been maintained, often analyzing cost-
benefit aspects of actual measures taken versus measures that could have 
been taken.83 Courts are reluctant to find an absence of “reasonable 
measures” as a matter of law when the trade secret owner took some 
measures to ensure secrecy.84 
There is no minimum standard for precautions that must be taken for 
a court to find “reasonable measures” to protect secrecy.85 However, 
some measures that courts will often consider when evaluating 
“reasonable measures” are: (1) use of techniques to put employees and 
others on notice of the trade secret status of the subject matter with 
which they are working; (2) posting cautionary signs; (3) restricting 
visitors; (4) dividing the work process into several steps and among 
several departments, thus maintaining internal secrecy; (5) using coded 
information or ingredients; (6) keeping secret documents or materials 
locked up; and (7) limiting access to computer materials using 
passwords.86 But, the techniques that can be employed to maintain 
                                                     
78. Id. (publication of the secret destroys its value as such); YEH, supra note 39, at 3 (“Once a 
trade secret has been exposed to the public, its protected character is lost and cannot later be 
retrieved.”). 
79. MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 39, § 1.04. 






86. Id. This is not an exhaustive list, but are some of the most commonly evaluated measures. 
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secrecy are infinite.87 Practically, the care taken to maintain secrecy 
corresponds to the economic value and the nature of the trade secret, as 
some secrets are more easily protected with minimal precautions than 
others are with extensive safeguards.88 
Thus, use of a trade secret does not necessarily destroy trade secret 
protection, as long as “reasonable measures” are taken to ensure that it 
remains secret.89 As such, “protected transactions involving trade 
secrets, such as licensing them or disclosing them on a confidential basis 
for evaluation, cannot be equated with unprotected use.”90 
However, one way that the secrecy of a trade secret is lost is through 
misappropriation. Tort law handles misappropriation of trade secrets.91 
There are three main ways that a trade secret can be misappropriated: 
first, when an individual obtains the information through improper (i.e., 
illegal) means, such as theft, bribery, misrepresentation, or espionage;92 
second, when an individual uses or discloses the trade secret through a 
breach of confidence;93 third, if someone knows that a trade secret was 
obtained through improper means and discloses it anyway or if they 
disclose it by mistake.94 
However, the traditional forms of misappropriation are not the only 
ways that trade secrets can be disclosed. Trade secrets can be 
publicized—and their protection lost—“accidently or intentionally . . . 
by anyone.”95 Sometimes this disclosure can even be by the government. 
A public records request will make public any information contained 
within the documents requested,96 potentially even information 
otherwise qualifying for trade secret protection. 





91. YEH, supra note 39, at 3. 
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1993); see also 
YEH, supra note 39, at 3. 
93. YEH, supra note 39, at 3 (giving the example of an employee who switches jobs and then 
breaks a confidentiality agreement and discloses the prior employer’s trade secrets). 
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1993); see also id. 
§ 40 cmt. d (observing that if someone accepts a trade secret from a third party, knowing it was 
acquired through a “breach of a duty of confidence” (i.e. theft), that person is subject to liability; 
conversely, someone who acquires a trade secret from a third party without knowing that it was 
stolen is not liable). 
95. YEH, supra note 39, at 3. 
96. See Goldman, supra note 8, at 711 (observing that the success of the Freedom of Information 
Act lies (in part) on the “fullest responsible disclosure” and that “disclosure of agency records is the 
act’s foremost goal”). 
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II. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
The federal FOIA is one of the most important resources the public 
can use to ensure government transparency.97 FOIA grants the citizenry 
broad access to the inner workings of their government, empowering 
“any person”98 to have access to “any record” if they just ask.99 It has 
been so influential that most states’ public records acts, including 
Washington State’s,100 were modeled after FOIA.101 
FOIA has its roots in the Cold War.102 In the 1950s and ’60s, the 
public was concerned about increased government secrecy and 
supported passing a law to promote government transparency.103 So, in 
1955, Democratic Congressman John Moss suggested passing such a 
law.104 However, there was a strong contingent in the government that 
opposed such action.105 Among the group suspicious of the bill was 
Lyndon B. Johnson.106 In fact, years later upon signing the bill into law 
as President, he released a written statement declaring his concerns 
about the impact on national security.107 However, he ended the 
statement, “I signed this measure with a deep sense of pride that the 
United States is an open society,”108 demonstrating that the interest in 
transparency won out in the end.109 
                                                     
97. History of FOIA, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/transparency/history-
of-foia [https://perma.cc/U7X2-QV8P]. 
98. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012). If “any person” can make a public records request, then 
certainly business competitors are included in that broad grant. See infra note 122 (describing the 
broad definition of “any person”). 
99. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B). 
100. See Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 266, 884 P.2d 
592, 605 (1994). 
101. State Public Record Laws, supra note 24. 
102. History of FOIA, supra note 97. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. (noting Moss could not find a republican co-sponsor for years after first announcing the 
project and that “every federal agency and department at the time opposed it”). 
106. Id. 
107. Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the U.S., Statement by the President Upon Signing S. 1160 
(July 4, 1966), http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//nsa/foia/FOIARelease66.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP88-
GXRM] (“[A] democracy works best when the people have all the information that the security of 
the nation permits . . . [and] I have always believed that freedom of information is so vital that only 
the national security . . . should determine when it must be restricted.”). 
108. Id. 
109. History of FOIA, supra note 97. President Johnson also signed the bill on the 4th of July 
(1966), a holiday that is synonymous with freedom from government oppression. Id. That obvious 
symbolism also seems to undercut any opposition he may have wanted to raise against government 
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However, when the bill was signed and FOIA was codified in title 
five, section 552 of the United States Code,110 it lacked the force 
necessary to get government agencies to comply with its 
requirements.111 It was not until after Watergate that FOIA was amended 
to become a more forceful statute.112 The Senate and House, overriding 
President Ford’s veto, added “many new requirements, timeframes, 
[and] sanctions for wrongly withheld information” and waived FOIA 
fees for journalists and public interest groups.113 
Since then the dominant trend has been curtailing FOIA’s power.114 
While the Electronic Freedom of Information Act, passed during the 
Clinton administration, provided for greater accessibility of government 
documents online, the three administrations that followed have been 
highly secretive.115 After September 11th, the Bush administration 
limited the public’s access to former presidential records and failed to 
comply with many of FOIA’s provisions.116 Likewise, despite promises 
to the contrary, the Obama administration failed to comply with many of 
FOIA’s requirements.117 The Trump administration has also “been 
widely criticized for trying to circumvent the norms of disclosure and 
transparency to shield its inner workings from public view.”118 President 
Trump has stopped “releasing logs of visitors to the White House,” 
“banned cameras from news briefings,” and has notoriously “refus[ed] to 
                                                     
transparency. 
110. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
111. See Ralph Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 1 (1970). Mr. Nader conducted a three-month test of FOIA and concluded:  
“[G]overnment officials at all levels in many of these agencies have [been able to get away 
with] systematically and routinely violat[ing] both the purpose and specific provisions of the 
law. These violations have become so regular and cynical that they seriously block citizen 
understanding and participation in government. Thus the Act, designed to provide citizens with 
tools of disclosure, has been forged into a shield against citizen access. There is a prevailing, 
official belief that these federal agencies need not tolerate searching inquiries or even routine 
inquiries that appear searching because of their infrequency.”  
Id. at 2. 
112. History of FOIA, supra note 97. 
113. Id. Thus, the problems Mr. Nader pointed out were addressed (if not completely solved) by 
imposing penalties on the agencies officials. Non-compliance with, or avoidance of, a public 
records request was no longer an option. 
114. See generally id. 
115. Id.; Kate Kelly & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Lawsuit Challenges Secrecy of White House 
Advisors on Infrastructure, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/us/ 
politics/lawsuit-infrastructure-trump.html [https://perma.cc/P89Q-B4PV]. 
116. History of FOIA, supra note 97 (“[T]he Bush Administration[] . . . was widely regarded as 
the most secretive administration in history.”). 
117. Id. 
118. Kelly & Davis, supra note 115. 
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release his income tax returns,” breaking with decades of tradition.119 
Despite multiple administrations curtailing the power of FOIA, it is 
still one of the greatest tools to ensure federal government 
transparency.120 FOIA provides that federal government records must be 
made available to the public upon request.121 The statute provides that 
“any person”122 can make a request.123 Likewise, FOIA makes no 
distinction between records created by government agencies and records 
that are merely collected by those agencies “after being submitted by 
private business concerns.”124 Thus, any record an agency possesses is 
likely subject to a disclosure request.125 
However, as a consequence of the competing interests that surround 
FOIA, Congress added nine exemptions to FOIA’s general requirement 
of disclosure.126 FOIA provides that there are several “matters” to which 
“[t]his section does not apply.”127 The fourth listed exemption includes 
“trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a 
person and privileged or confidential.”128 When the original FOIA bill 
was introduced to Congress this exemption was drafted as “trade secrets 
and other information obtained from the public and customarily 
privileged or confidential.”129 It was intended to cover information 
“obtained by the Government” but that the person from whom it was 
obtained would not normally disclose to the public.130 When the Senate 
revisited the bill, the exemption was redrafted to read “trade secrets and 
commercial or financial information.”131 The change was to ensure that 
information that was submitted in connection with a loan was covered.132 
                                                     
119. Id. 
120. History of FOIA, supra note 97. 
121. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
122. The definition of “person,” applied by FOIA, is quite expansive and basically includes every 
conceivable entity that is not the government itself. A “person” is defined as “an individual, 
partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency.” Id. 
§ 551(2). Thus, pretty much any organization or individual has access to government records if they 
simply submit a request for them. 
123. Id. § 552(a)(3)(A). 
124. Goldman, supra note 8, at 709. 
125. Id. at 709–10. 
126. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9). 
127. Id. § 552(b). 
128. Id. § 552(b)(4). 
129. S. REP. NO. 88-1219, at 6 (1964). 
130. Id. 
131. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 44 (1965). 
132. See id. (noting that the exemption now includes “[s]pecifically . . . any commercial, 
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The House then clarified this change by adding that the exception would 
include “information which is given to an agency in confidence.”133 
Thus, this provision has been treated as “cover[ing] two distinct 
categories of information,” trade secrets and the much broader 
“commercial or financial” information,134 which can apply to anything 
that falls under the ordinary definition of “commercial” or “financial.”135 
It seems that the intent was for FOIA to provide a clear exemption for 
trade secret information136 and also create a catchall exemption for other 
information that a person might entrust to the government “in 
confidence”137 but that would not qualify as a trade secret. 
III. THE WASHINGTON STATE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT, TRADE 
SECRET EXEMPTION, AND TENSION IN THE CASE LAW 
As mentioned above, the Washington State procurement system must 
balance the competing interests of government functionality and 
transparency.138 Broadly, the Department of Enterprise Services (DES or 
the Department) system seeks to “promote open competition,” 
conducted with the “highest ethical standards.”139 To that end, 
government procurement seeks to promote the welfare of the state by 
ensuring “proper accounting for contract expenditures” and encouraging 
the government to procure “goods and services from Washington small 
businesses.”140 However, the State has declared that it has just as great 
an interest in transparency, “ease of public review . . . [and] provid[ing] 
state agency contract data to the public in a searchable manner.”141 
Therefore as part of the statutory procurement framework, the legislature 
has declared that the records generated by government procurement are 
                                                     
technical, and financial data, submitted by an applicant or a borrower to a lending agency in 
connection with any loan application or loan”). 
133. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 31 (1965). 
134. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Exemption 4, in GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 263, 
263 (2004). 
135. See id. at 266. 
136. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012). 
137. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 31 (1965). 
138. See WASH. REV. CODE § 39.26.005 (2016) (describing the competing interests of 
“facilitat[ing] state agency purchase of goods and services” and “open competition and 
transparency”). 
139. Id.  
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
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“public records subject to disclosure” under the PRA.142 However, there 
are a number of exemptions to that broad mandate, including a trade 
secret exemption.143 
A. The Framework for Government Procurement in Washington State 
The Washington State government is a busy entity, maintaining 
government services to better the lives of the citizenry. To complete the 
myriad of projects a government runs it must solicit services from 
outside businesses. This process of soliciting services is subject to a 
designated system laid out by the state legislature.144 Government 
procurement policy seeks to obtain the best services at the lowest cost to 
accomplish the projects the state has set out.145 However, these interests 
must be balanced with the competing government interest of 
transparency.146 Hence, the documents generated when a good or service 
is procured are subject to Washington State’s PRA and must be 
disclosed upon request.147 
In 2011,148 the Washington State legislature established a specific 
government agency that is responsible for procuring all necessary goods 
and services, the DES.149 The purpose of creating this organization was 
to provide “centralized leadership in efficiently and cost-effectively 
managing resources necessary to support the delivery of state 
government services.”150 To that end, the Department is charged with 
“provid[ing] products and services to support state agencies”151 and is 
responsible for entering into contracts on behalf of the state.152 In short, 
DES is responsible for procuring all goods and services on behalf of the 
                                                     
142. Id. § 39.26.030. 
143. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2016) (containing language that gives rise to 
Washington State’s trade secret exemption). 
144. See generally Agency Overview, WASH. DEP’T ENTERPRISE SERVS., 
https://des.wa.gov/about/agency-overview [https://perma.cc/5AVU-7CNS]. 
145. See e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 200-01-020 (2016) (noting that DES manages the resources 
that are “necessary to support the delivery of state government services”). 
146. See discussion supra Introduction.  
147. See WASH. REV. CODE § 39.26.030. 
148. 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 3523; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 200-01-020 (“The department, 
created in chapter 43, Laws of 2011 . . .”).  
149. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.19.005 (2016) (“The department of enterprise services is created as 
an executive branch agency.”). 
150. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 200-01-020. 
151. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.19.005. 
152. Id. § 43.19.011(2)(a). 
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government and for overseeing and funding those contracts.153 
The legislature established a general framework that DES follows 
when monitoring the procurement process.154 First, agencies that are 
soliciting goods or services must provide notice to all businesses that 
they are accepting bids for a particular project.155 DES operates an 
“enterprise vendor registration” and “bid notification” system as 
mandated by statute.156 This system bears the unwieldy title of 
“Washington Electronic Business Solution.”157 Vendors are required to 
register with this system.158 Government agencies post contract 
opportunities on the system159 and registered vendors then receive notice 
of these opportunities through email.160 Vendors can also view notices 
by going to the DES website.161 Additionally, agencies may fulfill the 
notice requirement by sending vendors and potential bidders notices by 
mail, newspaper advertisements, or other appropriate methods.162 
Once DES posts the notice (also referred to as a solicitation), vendors 
submit their bids.163 The DES website provides a set of “Preparation 
Tips” that vendors can follow to help ensure that they submit a 
competitive bid.164 For example, vendors might attend pre-bid 
conferences or site visits and research previous bids and contracts from 
that particular agency.165 The bid must be delivered to DES’s office in 
Olympia before the date and time set for the bid opening and be signed 
in ink.166 Vendors may attend any bid opening, but the winning bidder is 
not determined at the bid opening.167 The only information disclosed at 
                                                     
153. See generally id. § 43.19.011; WASH. REV. CODE § 39.26.080 (2016) (“The director is 
responsible for the development and oversight of policy for the procurement of goods and services 
by all state agencies . . . .”). 
154. See WASH. REV. CODE § 39.26. 
155. Id. § 39.26.150(1). 
156. Id. 
157. Doing Business with the State, WASH. DEP’T ENTERPRISE SERVS., http://www.des.wa.gov/ 
services/contracting-purchasing/doing-business-state [https://perma.cc/5WJA-AZG7]. 
158. Id. 
159. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.26.150(1). 




162. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.26.150(1).  
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the bid opening is the name of the bidder and the time the bid was 
received.168 
Once all the bids are received, the Procurement Coordinator (an 
officer of DES) analyzes the bids to ensure they comply with the 
conditions of the solicitation and that the vendor is actually capable of 
providing the goods or services required.169 The requesting agency then 
has three options.170 First, it can reject all bids and rebid or cancel the 
solicitation.171 Second, it can solicit “best and final offers” from 
promising bidders172 to try and improve their options. Finally, it can 
award the contract to a bidder.173 To win a contract the vendor must be 
the “lowest responsive and responsible” bidder,174 which the agency 
determines.175 The agency may then enter into negotiations with the 
“lowest responsive and responsible” bidder to see if the bid can be 
approved.176 Once the agency has chosen the recipient of the contract 
(the Apparent Successful Vendor), it will announce its decision and 
make all received bids available for public viewing.177 Generally, this is 
the procurement framework that all state agencies use.178 A local agency 
would have its own framework, but would still be subject to PRA 
                                                     
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.26.160(1)(a)(i)–(iii) (2016). 
171. Id. § 39.26.160(1)(a)(i). 
172. Id. § 39.26.160(1)(a)(ii). 
173. Id. § 39.26.160(1)(a)(iii). 
174. Id. 
175. See id. § 39.26.160(2)(a)–(f) (providing the following factors to determine whether a bidder 
is responsible: “(a) The ability, capacity, and skill of the bidder to perform the contract or provide 
the service required; (b) The character, integrity, reputation, judgment, experience, and efficiency of 
the bidder; (c) Whether the bidder can perform the contract within the time specified; (d) The 
quality of performance of previous contracts or services; (e) The previous and existing compliance 
by the bidder with laws relating to the contract or services; and (f) Such other information as may be 
secured having a bearing on the decision to award the contract”); id. § 39.26.160(3)(a)–(f) (laying 
out “best value criteria” for determining the lowest responsive and responsible bidder: “(a) Whether 
the bid satisfies the needs of the state as specified in the solicitation documents; (b) Whether the bid 
encourages diverse contractor participation; (c) Whether the bid provides competitive pricing, 
economies, and efficiencies; (d) Whether the bid considers human health and environmental 
impacts; (e) Whether the bid appropriately weighs cost and noncost considerations; and (f) Life-
cycle cost”). 
176. Id. § 39.26.160(6). 
177. About the Bidding Process, supra note 160. 
178. Frequently Asked Questions, WASH. DEP’T ENTERPRISE SERVS., http://www.des.wa.gov/ 
about/about-enterprise-services/frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/QSP9-DLT8] (noting 
that DES provides services to the “state government”). 
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requirements.179 
B. General Disclosure Requirements and Framework of the PRA 
The PRA is codified in title forty-two, chapter fifty-six of the Revised 
Code of Washington (RCW).180 The PRA was originally adopted in 
1972.181 It has been frequently revised since then.182 It requires that 
“most records maintained by state, county, and city governments be 
made available to members of the public.”183 PRA also applies to all 
state and local agencies,184 as well as the legislature.185 
Like all state agencies, DES must follow the PRA disclosure 
framework for documents generated by the procurement process.186 The 
director of DES appoints a public records officer,187 who is responsible 
for overseeing the Department’s rules concerning disclosure of these 
documents and making sure that the Department’s disclosure program 
complies with the PRA.188 To obtain a document from DES, a person 
must submit a public records request to the public records officer.189 The 
request can be in writing—using the proper form—or by letter, phone, 
fax, or email.190 The public request form is available for download at 
DES’s website to ensure easy access.191 The one caveat is that bid 
submissions and evaluations are exempt from disclosure until a 
                                                     
179. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.580(1) (2016) (“Each state and local agency shall appoint and 
publicly identify a public records officer whose responsibility is to serve as a point of contact for 
members of the public in requesting disclosure of public records and to oversee the agency’s 
compliance with the public records disclosure requirements of this chapter.”). 
180. Id. § 42.56; MRSC, PUBLIC RECORDS ACT FOR WASHINGTON CITIES, COUNTIES, AND 
SPECIAL PURPOSE DISTRICTS 7 (2016). 
181. WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTERS PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION TUESDAY, 
NOVEMBER 7, 1972, at 11 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 VOTERS PAMPHLET]; MRSC, supra note 180, at 
7. 
182. MRSC, supra note 180, at 7.  
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(2). 
186. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 200-01 (2016). 
187. Each “state and local agency” is required to “appoint and publicly identify a public records 
officer.” WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.580(1). It is that person’s responsibility to interact with 
members of the public seeking disclosure and to oversee that the particular agency is in compliance 
with the PRA. Id. 
188. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 200-01-030. 
189. Id. § 200-01-040. 
190. Id.; Request a Public Record, WASH. DEP’T ENTER. SERVS., http://www.des.wa.gov/about/ 
news-media-center/request-public-record [https://perma.cc/8XUP-DADP]. 
191. Request a Public Record, supra note 190. 
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procuring agency announces the Apparent Successful Vendor.192 
Within five days of receiving a request the public records officer will 
do one of three things: make the documents available for inspection and 
copying, provide a reasonable estimate for when the records will be 
available, or deny the request.193 The PRA may exempt some records or 
part of records.194 In that case, the public records officer will redact all or 
part of the documents and provide the requester with an explanation for 
why the record is being withheld, along with the relevant PRA 
exemption.195 
Once an agency receives a public records request, it has the option to 
inform a third party that may have an interest in the requested 
documents.196 Unless the agency is required by law to inform an 
interested third party, it is completely up to the disclosing agency 
whether to inform a third party.197 The purpose of giving a third party 
notice is to allow the third party to ask the requester to modify the 
request198 or obtain an injunction from a court preventing or limiting 
disclosure of the requested documents.199 If a third party has received 
notice of an impending public records request, they have a reasonable 
amount of time to obtain an injunction.200 However, it is the practice of 
many agencies to only allow ten days for a third party to obtain such an 
injunction.201 If the third party does not get an injunction by the end of 
that ten day period, the agency is required to disclose the records in 
full.202 
                                                     
192. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.26.030 (2016). 
193. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 200-01-045(1)(a)–(e). 
194. Id. § 200-01-045(3). 
195. Id. 
196. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.540 (2016) (“An agency has the option of notifying persons 
named in the record or to whom a record specifically pertains, that release of a record has been 
requested.”); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 200-01-045(2) (stating DES’s public records officer 
“may” give notice to an affected third party). 
197. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.540. 
198. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 200-01-045(2). 
199. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.540. 
200. Wade’s Eastside Gun Shop v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 185 Wash. 2d 270, 291, 372 P.3d 97, 
106 (2016) (noting that the PRA allows an agency to give a third party a “realistic opportunity” to 
obtain an injunction). 
201. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 44-14-04003(11) (2016) (“The practice of many agencies is to give 
ten days’ notice.”). 
202. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., OPEN GOVERNMENT RESOURCE MANUAL 17 
(2016), http://agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploadedfiles/Home/About_the_Office/Open_ 
Government/Open_Government_Internet_Manual/Open%20Government%20Resource%20Manual
%202016%20-%20Oct.%2031%202016%20%282%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP5S-6TT4]. For an 
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If a request is denied, the requester can submit a petition to the public 
records officer, who will give the petition to the agency for review.203 
The agency will review the petition and render a decision within two 
business days of the receipt of the petition.204 Once the agency has either 
affirmed or denied the refusal to disclose, the administrative procedures 
are considered exhausted and the requester or the affected agency may 
appeal the decision to the courts.205 
When DES discloses the documents obtained from vendors there is a 
danger that those companies will lose valuable assets. In order to give 
themselves the best chance of obtaining the contract, companies will 
include specific and precise secret information.206 Bidders will include 
this information in order to bolster their credentials or in response to 
specific requests.207 Thus, these bids often contain intellectual property 
assets that a company has a vested interest in keeping secret from its 
competitors.208 Moreover, the dangers of disclosure continue to exist 
beyond the bidding stage.209 Sometimes, as a condition to awarding the 
contract, a government agency may require the company to submit more 
confidential information about its operations.210 
Even after that, when the contract has been in place for a while, the 
contracted company may be required to submit ongoing disclosures to 
                                                     
example of this process see the discussion of the Robbins Geller case, infra section III.C.4. 
203. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 200-01-080(1)(a), (c). 
204. But see id. § 200-01-080(2) (providing that the two-day period may be shortened or 
lengthened by agreement between DES and the requester). 
205. Id. § 200-01-080(3)–(4). 
206. See JACK BOOS & SONIA R. GIOSEFFI, K&L GATES, LEGAL INSIGHT: THE THREAT OF 
DISCLOSURE OF PROPRIETARY INFORMATION UNDER THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1 
(2013), http://m.klgates.com/files/Publication/03c1b0ac-8319-419c-98e1-683153ec1686/Presen 
tation/PublicationAttachment/7eb35c17-21c9-470b-a50b-703c128aa9bb/Government_Contracts_ 
Alert_09102013.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQ75-7AJH] (discussing the issue in the context of the 
California Public Records Act). 
207. Id. After all, the government wants to make sure that it is getting the best product. When 
shopping, it is not wise to take the merchants at their word. Prudent shoppers check their facts and 
research the product. The government is no different; important aspects of a vendor’s contract could 
end up in the bid at the government’s request. This presents a problem for the vendor trying to 
protect its intellectual property. It goes beyond trade secrets as well. What if the vendor has a patent 
pending? Public disclosure of their patent information would destroy the patentability of their 
innovation and they would lose that protection.  
208. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 44-14-06002(7) (2016) (“Many agencies hold sensitive 
proprietary information of businesses they regulate. For example, an agency might require an 
applicant for a regulatory approval to submit designs for a product it produces.”). 
209. BOOS & GIOSEFFI, supra note 206, at 1–2. 
210. Id. 
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the agency that may include its confidential information.211 Because the 
law only protects certain intellectual property assets as long as they are 
kept secret,212 disclosure of these trade secrets could be catastrophic for 
businesses submitting bids for government contracts. For this reason, it 
is important that the PRA have a fully functioning trade secret 
exemption. 
C. The Various Trade Secret Exemptions in the PRA 
Unlike FOIA, the Washington PRA includes several exemptions for 
trade secret information. One exemption is derived from an obscure, 
two-word phrase that relies on the UTSA to exempt trade secrets. The 
others stem from a list of exemptions for various specific examples of 
trade secrets, embodied in RCW 42.56.270. 
1. The “Official” Trade Secret Exemption 
Washington’s PRA “closely parallels” the federal Freedom of 
Information Act.213 Like the federal act, the Washington PRA was the 
“product of the ‘open government’ climate brought about by distrust of 
government accountability and by misuse of government power during 
the civil rights and Vietnam protest era.”214 However, unlike the federal 
act,215 the PRA did not meet strong political opposition, as it passed “at a 
time when conservative opposition to such measures was discredited.”216 
In fact, in the Voters Pamphlet that accompanied the ballot (which is one 
of only a few primary source materials that exist from the original 
act),217 even the “Statement against” refers to the Act as “well-
intentioned.”218 Later, “changes in the political climate” and other 
                                                     
211. Id. at 2. 
212. See discussion supra section I.B. 
213. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 266, 884 P.2d 592, 
605 (1994). 
214. ERIC M. STAHL & MICHAEL J. KILLEEN, OPEN GOVERNMENT GUIDE: OPEN RECORDS AND 
MEETINGS LAWS IN WASHINGTON 1 (6th ed. 2011). 
215. History of FOIA, supra note 97 (noting the strong opposition to FOIA, including from 
President Johnson). 
216. STAHL & KILLEEN, supra note 214. 
217. In contrast to FOIA, which was a formal piece of legislation passed through bicameral 
legislative process, the Washington PRA was originally enacted as a citizens’ initiative. See 1972 
VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 181, at 11. That initiative, I-276, created the public disclosure laws. 
Over time, these laws were amended to what we commonly refer to as the Public Records Act. See 
In re Request of Rosier, 105 Wash. 2d 606, 609, 717 P.2d 1353, 1356 (1986) (referring to what has 
become the PRA as the “public disclosure law”). 
218. 1972 VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 181, at 11. 
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factors led to a “legislative and judicial retrenchment . . . including an 
increase in the number and scope of exemptions.”219 But, the political 
climate at the time resulted in a state act that “is more severe than the 
federal act in many areas.”220 The Washington PRA emphasizes heavily 
the benefits of government disclosure221 and thus, exceptions to a public 
records request are not accepted lightly.222 
Although trade secrets are now generally exempted,223 unlike FOIA, 
the Washington trade secret exemption is not clear on the face of the 
statute.224 The section on “[d]ocuments and indexes to be made public” 
provides that each government agency has to make available all public 
records, “unless the record falls within the specific exemptions of 
subsection (8) of this section, this chapter, or other statute which 
exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records.”225 
This “other statute” language triggers the trade secret exemption.226 
Not all statutes qualify under this language, as “an exemption will not 
be inferred or presumed.”227 In fact, the “other statute” provision 
“applies only to those exemptions explicitly identified in other 
statutes.”228 It does not allow a court to “imply exemptions but only 
allows specific exemptions to stand.”229 But the Washington State 
                                                     
219. STAHL & KILLEEN, supra note 214. 
220. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 266, 884 P.2d 592, 
605 (1994). 
221. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2016) (“The people of this state do not yield their 
sovereignty to the agencies that serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their 
public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for 
them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may maintain control over the 
instruments that they have created.”). 
222. See, e.g., id. (“This chapter shall be liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly 
construed to promote this public policy and to assure that the public interest will be fully 
protected.”). But see Sunshine Committee, WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/sunshine-committee [https://perma.cc/QLL5-QBDM] (observing that the 
number of exemptions has grown from ten to over 500 since the PRA’s enactment). 
223. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (containing the language for Washington State’s trade 
secret exemption). 
224. Id. 
225. Id. (emphasis added). 
226. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 262, 884 P.2d 592, 
603 (1994) (holding that the UTSA qualifies as an “other statute”). 
227. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., OPEN GOVERNMENT RESOURCE MANUAL 23 
(Oct. 31, 2016), http://agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploadedfiles/Home/About_the_Office 
/Open_Government/Open_Government_Internet_Manual/Open%20Government%20Resource%20
Manual%202016%20-%20Oct.%2031%202016%20%282%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP5S-6TT4]. 
228. Progressive Animal, 125 Wash. 2d at 262, 884 P.2d at 603. 
229. Brouillet v. Cowles Publ’g Co., 114 Wash. 2d 788, 800, 791 P.2d 526, 533 (1990). 
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Supreme Court has held that the UTSA, as adopted by the Washington 
State Legislature,230 qualifies as an “other statute.”231 Thus, “a record is 
exempt from disclosure if it constitutes a ‘trade secret’ under the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”232 
The codification of the “other statute” path to exemption did not 
happen immediately. In the original initiative there were only ten named 
exemptions to the bill.233 They were all specific exemptions, excusing 
things like personal information,234 tax information,235 information 
compiled by law enforcement in the course of their criminal 
investigations,236 and examination data (e.g., test questions and scoring 
sheets).237 The “other statute” language was added in 1987 when the 
legislature amended a section of the PRA.238 The amendment was a 
response to a Washington State Supreme Court case, In re Request of 
Rosier.239 In that case, the Supreme Court took it upon itself to interpret 
a section of the PRA to imply a general exemption for personal 
privacy.240 The legislature immediately added the “other statute” 
language to keep the Court from creating its own exemptions.241 The 
legislature emphasized that exemptions to the PRA should be express 
and that agencies should not have to worry about courts changing the 
rules they have to follow.242 Since then, the number of PRA exemptions 
has grown considerably. Now, the PRA has over one hundred specific, 
                                                     
230. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.108 (2016) (Washington’s adoption of the UTSA). 
231. Progressive Animal, 125 Wash. 2d at 262, 884 P.2d at 603 (“Two state statutes qualify as 
‘other statutes’ in the present context . . . . First, the State Uniform Trade Secrets Act . . . .”). 
232. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 44-14-06002(7) (2016). 
233. 1972 VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 181, at 63. 
234. Id. (exempted in section 31(1)(a)–(b)). 
235. Id. (exempted in section 31(1)(c)). 
236. Id. (exempted in section 31(1)(d)). 
237. Id. (exempted in section 31(1)(f)). 
238. E.S.H.B. 4, 50th Leg., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Wash. 1987). 
239. 105 Wash. 2d 606, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986). 
240. Id. at 609–13, 717 P.2d at 1356–58. 
241. H.B. Rep. on E.S.H.B. 4, 50th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 1987) (noting that testimony in 
favor stated: “(1) The release of public records should be based upon whether or not there is an 
express exemption prohibiting release; it should not be based upon a complex decision-making 
process for weighing various interests. (2) The bill clarifies that exemptions from disclosure can be 
found in other statutes outside the public disclosure statutes. (3) The Rosier decision obscured the 
guidance given agencies for releasing records; public agencies need bright lines of guidance”); see 
also Doe ex rel. Roe v. Wash. State Patrol, 185 Wash. 2d 363, 372, 372 P.3d 63, 67 (2016) (noting 
that “the legislature made it very clear, following our holding in In re Rosier . . . that it did not want 
this court creating exemptions when there were none” (citation omitted)). 
242. H.B. Rep. on E.S.H.B. 4, 50th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 1987). 
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named exemptions.243 Not only that but the “other statute” language 
sweeps in more than four hundred more records exemptions from other, 
non-PRA statutes.244 
2. Additional Trade Secret Exemptions 
The PRA includes other provisions that could be construed to exempt 
trade secrets.245 As mentioned above, the PRA has exploded beyond its 
original ten exemptions to include over one hundred named 
exemptions.246 These additional exemptions were added piece by piece, 
at many different times, encompassing all manner of situations247 and 
were added to the same section of the PRA.248 In 2006, the legislature 
attempted to clean up the PRA by re-codifying it in a new chapter under 
title forty-two of the Revised Code of Washington and organizing all the 
various exemptions by subject matter.249 As part of this reorganization, 
the legislature created RCW 42.56.270, an exemption for “[f]inancial, 
commercial, and proprietary information.”250 This provision currently 
includes some twenty-eight specific examples of situations when that 
type of information is exempted.251 For example, RCW 42.56.270(1) 
says that “[v]aluable formulae, designs, drawings, computer source code 
or object code, and research data obtained by any agency within five 
years of the request for disclosure when disclosure would produce 
private gain and public loss” is exempted from disclosure.252 Under the 
                                                     
243. Public Records Act, WASH. COAL. FOR OPEN GOV’T (Aug. 6, 2016), 
http://washingtoncog.org/public-records-act/ [https://perma.cc/9H4R-G9EJ]. 
244. Id. 
245. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270(1) (2016) (talking about material that could fit a 
definition of trade secrets under any of the four major codifications); id. § 42.56.270(11) 
(specifically mentioning “trade secrets”). 
246. Public Records Act, supra note 243. 
247. Here are examples of a few of the many exemptions: information relating to archeological 
sites, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.300; library records, id. § 42.56.310; membership and ownership 
interests in timeshares and condominiums, id. § 42.56.340; client records for domestic abuse or 
sexual assault programs and services, id. § 42.56.370; information relating to agriculture and 
livestock, id. § 42.56.380; and information relating to “insurance and financial institutions,” id. 
§ 42.56.400. 
248. All of the exemptions were originally codified in WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.310. S.H.B. 
1133, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005). The list was so long that the last listed exemption was 
codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.310(1)(iii), having cycled through the entire alphabet twice 
and with some sections including many additional subsections. Id.  
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
251. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270. 
252. Id. § 42.56.270(1). Incidentally, this was one of the first ten exemptions included in the 
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UTSA’s definition of a trade secret,253 this type of information could 
easily qualify as a trade secret. In fact, the Washington State Supreme 
Court observed that “[t]he clear purpose of [this] exemption is to prevent 
private persons from using the Act to appropriate potentially valuable 
intellectual property for private gain,”254 seemingly confirming that the 
provision is intended to protect trade secrets. 
RCW 42.56.270 also includes sections that explicitly mention trade 
secrets. There are three sections that specifically mention trade secrets, 
sections 270(11), 270(16), and 270(28).255 However, they only exempt 
trade secrets in specific circumstances. Section 270(11) only exempts 
trades secrets if they relate to “(a) [a] vendor’s unique methods of 
conducting business; (b) data unique to the product or services of the 
vendor; or (c) determining prices or rates to be charged for 
services . . . for purposes of the development, acquisition, or 
implementation of state purchased health care.”256 Section 270(16) only 
exempts “trade secrets submitted by a permit holder, mine operator, or 
landowner to the department of natural resources.”257 Similarly, section 
270(28) only exempts trade secrets that are part of an agreement or 
contract entered into by a registered marijuana business.258 The existence 
of all of these different exemptions that seem to all exempt trade secrets 
creates tension in the statute, tension that is illustrated through two 
interesting cases. 
3. Progressive Animals Welfare Society v. University of Washington 
One of the most important Washington cases dealing with the PRA 
and exempt information is Progressive Animals Welfare Society v. 
University of Washington (PAWS).259 In that case, an animal rights group 
submitted a public records request to obtain information contained in a 
grant proposal.260 A scientist, working at the University of Washington, 
proposed research to study the brain development of monkeys who were 
                                                     
original initiative that created what is now the PRA. 1972 VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 181, at 
63. 
253. UTSA § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
254. Servais v. Port of Bellingham, 127 Wash. 2d 820, 829, 904 P.2d 1124, 1129 (1995) 
(referencing WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270(1)). 
255. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270(11), (16), (28). 
256. Id. § 42.56.270(11). 
257. Id. § 42.56.270(16). 
258. Id. § 42.56.270(28). 
259. 125 Wash. 2d 243, 884 P.2d 592 (1994). 
260. Id. at 243, 884 P.2d at 592. 
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raised without social interaction.261 Through this research, the scientist 
hoped to understand why some humans engage in self-injurious behavior 
and to eventually treat such behavior.262 The scientist submitted a grant 
request in order to obtain funding for his project.263 Progressive Animal 
Welfare Society (the Society) submitted a public records request to the 
University.264 The University denied the request and the Society filed 
suit to obtain the records.265 The University argued that the grant 
proposal was exempt from disclosure under a number of exemptions, 
including the PRA “other statute” exemption for trade secrets266 and the 
“financial, commercial, and proprietary information” section.267 On the 
surface, this public records request looks like a simple attempt to ensure 
the humane treatment of research animals, but the problem is that the 
grant proposal contained information that could potentially “eventuate in 
trade secrets.”268 
The Court’s analysis in this case is problematic for several reasons. 
First, it is odd that the court concluded that the University held trade 
secrets. In general, public universities do not hold trade secrets. 
Therefore, it is unusual that this case, and this set of facts, would result 
in the controlling decision on trade secret exemption. 
Second, after the decision in In re Rosier, the Washington Legislature 
declared specifically that the rules governing disclosure of information 
should be clear.269 The rules governing the disclosure or nondisclosure 
of trade secrets are anything but clear after this case. When discussing 
the “other statute” exemption, the Washington State Supreme Court 
recognized that the University has an interest in preventing exposure of 
information that has “even potential economic value.”270 This seems like 
                                                     
261. Id. at 247, 884 P.2d at 595. 
262. Id. 
263. Id.  
264. Id.  
265. Id. at 250, 884 P.2d at 596. 
266. Id. at 261–63, 884 P.2d at 602–03. 
267. Id. at 254, 884 P.2d at 599. 
268. Id. at 262, 884 P.2d at 603. 
269. E.S.H.B. 4, 50th Leg., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Wash. 1987). In the In re Rosier decision, the 
Court made a new rule for determining when information that reveals a unique fact about a 
particular individual is exempt from disclosure. See In re Request of Rosier, 105 Wash. 2d 606, 717 
P.2d 1353 (1986). In response, the Legislature declared that the disclosure of public records should 
be based on whether or not there is an express exemption, not a complicated balancing analysis. 
E.S.H.B. 4, 50th Leg., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Wash. 1987). Thus, the Legislature determined that 
the In re Rosier decision confused the guidance given to agencies and that the agencies need clear 
guidance. Id. 
270. Progressive Animal, 125 Wash. 2d at 262, 884 P.2d at 603. But see Belo Mgmt. Serv., Inc. 
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a sweeping declaration that the information at issue here was exempt as 
trade secrets under the “other statute” exemption.271 This would be fine, 
except that the Court introduced ambiguity by also utilizing a subsection 
of the “financial, commercial and proprietary information” exemption, a 
specific exemption for “valuable formulae” or “research data.”272 The 
Court had to adopt a broad view of the information at issue to hold that it 
fell under this exemption.273 Moreover, the Court blurred the lines 
between the “other statute” trade secret exemption and this exemption by 
couching this exemption in terms of potential loss of intellectual 
property and thus affirming that it also addressed trade secrets.274 The 
rules governing disclosure are supposed to be clear but, in this case, the 
court cannot seem to decide how exactly trade secrets are to be protected 
from disclosure. On the one hand, the Court seems to approve of 
widespread exemption for trade secrets, but on the other uses two 
different exemptions of the PRA to accomplish this, interpreting both 
incredibly broadly. This raises the question of why there needs to be two 
exemptions for the same thing. Despite the legislative mandate of clarity, 
the Court provided two different avenues of exemption, then blurred the 
distinction between the two, and subsequently gave both a wide reach. 
Third, the Court’s interpretation—that the UTSA qualifies as an 
“other statute”275—does not agree with a logical reading of the statute 
and the provisions of the UTSA. The relevant provision of the RCW 
provides that each agency shall make all public records available for 
inspection, “unless the record falls within the specific exemptions of 
                                                     
v. ClickA Network, 184 Wash. App. 649, 658, 343 P.3d 370, 375 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (observing 
that releasing information that would give competitors an unfair advantage “is insufficient to prove 
that the information is a trade secret”). 
271. Progressive Animal, 125 Wash. 2d at 262, 884 P.2d at 603. The Court used a lot of strong 
language that seemed to back up the applicability of the “other statute” exemption. Id. (“Given the 
potential for unfunded biomedical grant proposals to eventuate in trade secrets . . . this ‘other 
statute’ operates as an independent limit on disclosure of portions of the record at issue here that 
have even potential economic value. The Public Records Act is simply an improper means to 
acquire knowledge of a trade secret.”). 
272. Id. at 254–55, 884 P.2d at 598–99. 
273. Id. at 255, 884 P.2d at 599 (“Valuable ‘research data’ include not only raw data but also the 
guiding hypotheses that structure the data.”). 
274. Id. (first noting that “[t]he clear purpose of the exemption is to prevent private persons from 
using the Act to appropriate potentially valuable intellectual property for private gain” and then also 
observing, “[m]oreover, the valuable research data implicit in unfunded grant proposals is precisely 
the kind of information or record envisaged by this exemption. If the data or hypotheses contained 
in the unfunded grant proposal were prematurely released, the disclosure would produce both the 
private gain constituted by potential intellectual property piracy and the public loss of patent or 
other rights”). 
275. Id. at 261–63, 884 P.2d at 602–03. 
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subsection (8) of this section, this chapter, or other statute which 
exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records.”276 A 
logical reading of the statute supports the conclusion that the to qualify 
as an “other statute” the statute in question must explicitly exempt or 
prohibit disclosure of the relevant records. However, the UTSA does not 
explicitly exempt trade secrets from disclosure as a result of a public 
records request.277 Nowhere does the UTSA explicitly provide for an 
exemption from public records requests for trade secrets.278 The UTSA 
only provides a framework for misappropriation and various remedies 
for misappropriation,279 but not an exemption for trade secrets from 
public records requests. This is very unlike other acts that have been 
held to qualify as “other statutes.” Those statutes provide an exemption 
from public records requests.280 Given the Washington State Supreme 
Court’s own mandate that the “other statute” exemption only applies to 
exemptions “explicitly identified” in other statutes281 it is strange (to say 
the least) that they then inferred an exemption in a statute that does not 
provide for an exemption from public records requests. The Court 
seemed to go against their express rule.  
Fourth, the Court did not spend a lot of time on this guidance. In the 
published, thirty-four-page case, the valuable formulae or research data 
exemption is allotted little more than one page,282 while the “other 
statute” link to the UTSA is given little more than a paragraph.283 The 
discussion of the valuable formulae focused mostly on the scope of this 
                                                     
276. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2016) (emphasis added). 
277. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 19.108 (2016) (Washington’s codified adoption of the 
UTSA). 
278. See e.g., id.  
279. See e.g., id. §§ 19.108.010–.030, 19.108.050, 19.108.900, 19.108.910. 
280. The language through which courts find exemptions in “other statutes” can be quite vague. 
For example, the Washington statute governing the confidentiality of child support records (WASH. 
REV. CODE. § 26.23.120 (2016)) provides that these records are subject to disclosure only as 
provided by that chapter and “under appropriate circumstances.” Id. § 26.23.120(1)–(3). This 
language has been held to qualify as an “other statute” because it provides an exemption to the 
general rule that all public records are subject to disclosure. Anderson v. Dep’t of Soc. and Health 
Servs., 196 Wash. App. 674, 683–84, 384 P.3d 651, 656–57 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016), review denied, 
188 Wash. 2d 1006, 393 P.3d 786 (2017). However, the UTSA does not even provide this tenuous 
language for the Court to justify its decision. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 19.108. 
281. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 262, 884 P.2d 592, 
603 (1994) (“[The ‘other statute’] language does not allow a court to imply exemptions but only 
allows specific exemptions to stand.” (internal quotations omitted)).  
282. Id. at 254–55, 884 P.2d at 598–99. 
283. Id. at 262–63, 884 P.2d at 602–04. 
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exemption as it pertained to research data and hypotheses.284 The 
analysis of the “other statute” exemption was limited to a mere 
declaration that the UTSA qualifies as an “other statute.”285 With this 
cursory analysis, the Court could not dive into the issue of trade secret 
exemption as completely as was necessary to provide clear guidance. 
These two to three pages on trade secret exemption does not provide the 
necessary guidance to institute a clear rule that public agencies can 
follow. 
4. Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd, LLP v. State 
Another example of the tension between the various trade secrets in 
the PRA occurred more recently in Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd, 
LLP v. State.286 An attorney from Atlanta287 filed a public records 
request to obtain information related to law firm responses to 
government solicitations.288 The Washington State Attorney General’s 
Office (AGO) submitted a request for qualifications and quotations from 
private law firms, who could represent the Workplace Safety and 
Insurance Board in future securities litigation.289 The AGO’s request 
warned firms that their responses were subject to disclosure under the 
PRA.290 Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd, LLP (Robbins Geller) 
submitted a response and even marked relevant portions as 
proprietary.291 Eventually, the AGO chose it to execute a securities 
agreement between the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board and the 
AGO.292 Vincent Gresham, a securities attorney293 (and presumably a 
competitor), filed a request for any information related to requests for 
proposals from securities law firms, as well as any responses.294 The 
                                                     
284. Id. at 254–55, 884 P.2d at 598–99. 
285. Id. at 262–63, 884 P.2d at 602–04. 
286. 179 Wash. App. 711, 328 P.3d 905 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). 
287. Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd, LLP v. Vincent T. Gresham and State of Washington, 
Office of the Attorney General, TRADE SECRETS INST., http://tsi.brooklaw.edu/cases/robbins-geller-
rudman-dowd-llp-v-vincent-t-gresham-and-state-washington-office-attorney-genera 
[https://perma.cc/3XL4-SYEC]. 





293. Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd, LLP v. Vincent T. Gresham and State of Washington, 
Office of the Attorney General, supra note 287. 
294. Robbins Geller, 179 Wash. App. at 717, 328 P.3d at 909. 
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AGO notified Robbins Geller that they had received the request and 
would release the firm’s response, including all the proprietary 
information if Robbins Geller did not obtain an injunction.295 Robbins 
Geller quickly filed a lawsuit against the AGO to keep it from disclosing 
their proprietary information, which included calculations for proposed 
fees, records of past billing, client lists, insurance information, and the 
names and contacts of client references.296 The Washington appellate 
court that heard the case concluded that the information did not 
constitute trade secrets under the UTSA.297 The court reasoned, with 
regard to parts of the proprietary information, that the specific 
information submitted was not materially different from their 
competitors and thus disclosure did not provide those competitors with a 
significant advantage.298 With regard to the rest of the information, the 
court discovered that it had already been disclosed, partially through the 
website The American Lawyer.299 Therefore, it was no longer a trade 
secret.300 Nonetheless, the court held that the law firm was permitted to 
invoke the financial, commercial, and proprietary exemption to the 
PRA.301 But, ultimately it decided that that exemption did not apply to 
the facts or information in this case.302 By holding that Robbins Geller 
could not invoke the “other statute” exemption but could invoke one of 
the myriad exemptions embodied in the financial, commercial, and 
proprietary exemption,303 the court implied that RCW 42.56.270 
exempts a much broader category of information than just trade secrets. 
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE TRADE SECRET 
EXEMPTION: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
There are several problems with the current trade secret exemption. 
As a result of there being two different avenues for trade secret 
exemption, there are also two different standards for injunctive relief. 
This results in a situation where the choice of exemption essentially 
translates to a choice for injunctive standard. Additionally, the ambiguity 
                                                     
295. Id. 
296. Id. at 717–18, 328 P.3d at 909. 
297. Id. at 723–27, 328 P.3d at 911–13. 
298. Id. at 723–24, 328 P.3d at 911–12. 
299. Id. at 724–27, 328 P.3d at 912–13. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. at 728–29, 328 P.3d at 914. 
302. Id. at 733–35, 328 P.3d at 916–17. 
303. This section of the PRA is WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270 (2016). 
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that has resulted from the case law and the existence of two different 
paths to exemption makes it difficult for business owners to protect their 
trade secrets. 
A. The Injunction Problem 
As discussed previously, an important piece of protecting a trade 
secret from disclosure is the process of obtaining an injunction to 
prevent an agency from disclosing records that contain trade secrets.304 
However, the presence of two separate, and differently constructed, 
provisions that address trade secret exemption raises a question of which 
injunctive standard applies. The PRA has its own injunctive standard.305 
A court can enjoin a record from being disclosed if the party seeking the 
injunction can meet four elements: (1) that the record in question 
specifically pertains to that party; (2) an exemption applies; (3) 
disclosure would not be in the public interest; and (4) disclosing the 
record would substantially and irreparably harm that party or a “vital 
government function.”306 In addition to these statutory requirements, a 
party must generally satisfy three common law requirements to obtain an 
injunction: “(a) a clear legal or equitable right; (b) a well-grounded fear 
of immediate invasion of that right; and (c) that the act complained off 
will result in actual or substantial injury.”307 However, as a Washington 
State appellate court recently recognized: 
It is unclear how these [common law] requirements relate to the 
injunction requirements of RCW 42.56.540, and no case has 
applied these general requirements in a RCW 42.56.540 case. 
However, the first two requirements for a permanent injunction 
relate to the existence of an exemption and the third requirement 
is consistent with a similar requirement in RCW 42.56.540.308  
What is clear is that when a third party tries to stop an agency from 
disclosing a particular record, they must satisfy the PRA injunctive 
standard.309 
                                                     
304. See discussion of the Robbins Geller case supra section III.C.4. 
305. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.540. 
306. Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Office of Attorney Gen. of Wash., 177 Wash. 2d 467, 487, 300 
P.3d 799, 809 (2013); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.540. 
307. Huff v. Wyman, 184 Wash. 2d 643, 651, 661 P.3d 727, 731 (2015). 
308. Wash. Pub. Emp. Ass’n v. Wash. State Ctr. for Childhood Deafness & Hearing Loss, 404 
P.3d 111, 115 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (citing SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health 
Servs., 193 Wash. App. 377, 393, 377 P.3d 214, 221 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016), review denied, 186 
Wash. 2d 1016, 380 P.3d 502 (2016)). 
309. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.540; see also Doe ex rel. Roe v. Wash. State Patrol, 185 Wash. 
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However, many “other statutes” also have their own injunctive 
standards, including the UTSA.310 The UTSA provides that “[a]ctual or 
threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.”311 This implies that an 
automatic injunction may be imposed if the court even suspects 
misappropriation. But, in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,312 the 
United States Supreme Court held that a court may not impose an 
automatic injunction without adhering to the well-established principles 
of equity.313 Thus, a person seeking an injunction must satisfy a well-
known, four-part test, demonstrating that (1) they have suffered an 
irreparable injury; (2) available legal remedies are inadequate to 
compensate them for that injury; (3) an injunction is warranted; and (4) 
granting the injunction would be in the public interest.314 
The Washington State Supreme Court, in PAWS, held that “this ‘other 
statute’ [the UTSA] operates as an independent limit on disclosure of 
portions of the records at issue here that have even potential economic 
value.”315 It went on to observe that the “Public Records Act is simply 
an improper means to acquire knowledge of a trade secret.”316 In 
addition, the PAWS case neglected to clarify this statement, a statement 
made in dicta.317 The Court did not define when making a public records 
                                                     
2d 363, 370, 372 P.3d 63, 66 (2016) (“In an action brought under the injunction statute, [WASH. 
REV. CODE] § 42.56.540, the party seeking to prevent disclosure . . . bears the burden of proof.”). 
310. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.108.020(1) (2016). 
311. Id. 
312. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
313. Id. at 391. 
314. Id. eBay v. MercExchange was a patent case, explicitly holding that a finding of patent 
infringement did not justify the granting of an automatic injunction without going through the test. 
Id. (“The decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by 
the district court, reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion. These familiar principles apply with 
equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act.”). However, this holding has been extended to 
the other forms of intellectual property as well. Id. at 392–93 (“And as in our decision today, this 
Court has consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule 
that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed.”); see 
also La Quinta Worldwide LLC v. Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C.V., 762 F.3d 867, 880 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(extending the eBay ruling to trademarks). While no legally persuasive case has explicitly extended 
the holding to trade secrets yet, the fact that it applies to all the other forms of intellectual property 
is strong evidence that automatic injunctions are also not allowed in the trade secret context. 
315. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 262, 884 P.2d 592, 
603 (1994) (emphasis added). 
316. Id. Despite this observation, Washington courts have not addressed whether or not a public 
records request rises to the level of trade secret misappropriation, dispensing with the injunctive 
standard required by the PRA. 
317. Id.  
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request rises to the level of misappropriation and when it does not.318 
This unusual, and very unhelpful, as it departs from the commonly 
accepted federal principle that simply making a public records request 
for trade secret information is not misappropriation.319 
This observation might suggest that, in Washington State, a public 
records request could amount to trade secret misappropriation, which 
can be enjoined by the courts320 without engaging in the traditional 
public records injunctive standard.321 In fact, the Robbins Geller law 
firm and the Washington State Attorney General’s office tried to argue 
this theory in Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd, LLP v. State.322 
However, the Washington State appellate court that heard the case 
observed that “[n]o court has addressed whether the PRA injunction 
standard, RCW 42.56.540, applies when a court relies on an ‘other 
statute’ exemption, such as the UTSA, rather than a PRA exemption to 
bar disclosure.”323 The court also declined to provide guidance on the 
issue,324 thereby leaving the question of which injunctive standard 
applies when using the possible different trade secret exemptions 
unresolved. 
This leaves a multitude of questions unanswered. Does use of PRA to 
obtain a competitor’s trade secret constitute misappropriation under the 
UTSA, such that the UTSA’s standard applies? Does the UTSA 
injunctive standard only apply when someone uses the “other statute” 
language to trigger the exemption? Does the PRA standard only apply if 
someone uses a named exemption in the PRA, like RCW 42.56.270? If 
using the PRA to obtain trade secrets is misappropriation, then does a 
                                                     
318. Id.  
319. See generally discussion supra Part II (discussing the exemption of trade secret information 
from public records requests in FOIA). 
320. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.108.020(1) (2016). 
321. Under the PRA, a court may grant an injunction prohibiting the disclosure of information 
through a public records request only if it finds that disclosure “would clearly not be in the public 
interest and would substantially and irreparably damage any person, or would substantially and 
irreparably damage vital governmental functions.” WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.540 (2016). 
322. Brief for Respondent at 31–32, Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd, LLP v. State, 179 Wash. 
App. 711, 328 P.3d 905 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (No. 44520–4–II), 2012 WL 8944930, at *31–32 
(arguing that because of the holding in PAWS “an injunction will issue under the UTSA to protect a 
trade secret from public disclosure without a showing that” the PRA elements for injunctive relief 
had been met). 
323. Robbins Geller, 179 Wash. App. at 726, 328 P.3d at 913. 
324. Id. The court in Robbins Geller applied the PRA injunctive standard to the WASH. REV. 
CODE § 42.56.270 claims, but declined to apply any injunctive standard to the “other statute” claims 
because it determined that the information at issue was not trade secrets under the UTSA. See id. at 
731–32, 325 P.3d at 915–16. 
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business forfeit the UTSA’s automatic injunction if they used one of the 
provisions in RCW 42.56.270 to trigger an exemption? All of these 
unanswered questions increase the difficulty of getting an injunction, 
deterring small businesses from going through the process of obtaining 
an injunction and likely resulting in the loss of trade secrets. 
Additionally, this ambiguity leaves attorneys and judges unclear on how 
to proceed when advising clients and deciding cases. As has been 
argued, the difference between the various exemptions as applied 
warrants clarification. Therefore, it is hard to predict which injunctive 
standard will be applied. Given the right set of facts, this gap in the 
disclosure framework could present a complex conundrum. 
1. The Washington Legislature and Courts Should Adopt the PRA 
Injunctive Standard and Dispense with the UTSA Injunctive 
Standard 
Although the Washington State Supreme Court has ruled that the 
UTSA’s injunctive standard can be applied to public records requests for 
trade secrets, the Court should dispense with it in favor of the PRA 
injunctive standard. First, the UTSA’s automatic injunction for even 
threatened misappropriation is unlikely to find legal support in the post-
eBay legal framework. After eBay, courts must conduct the traditional 
equitable relief test before granting an injunction.325 Courts cannot 
simply impose an automatic injunction.326 The PRA injunctive standard 
already strongly resembles this test.327 This makes it easier to simply 
apply the PRA injunctive standard instead of having to decide whether 
requesting public records is or is not misappropriation before being able 
to apply the UTSA standard.328 Thus, applying the UTSA’s injunctive 
standard conflicts with federal law and is more difficult than applying 
the PRA standard. Second, the PRA standard works. Public records 
requests should be subject to an analysis that weighs the competing 
interests in government transparency with the potential harm that could 
                                                     
325. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
326. Id.; see also discussion supra note 314 (noting that the holding of eBay has been expanded 
to the other forms of intellectual property as well). 
327. Compare Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Office of Attorney Gen. of Wash., 177 Wash. 2d 467, 
487, 300 P.3d 799, 809 (2013), and WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.540 (2016) (laying out the PRA 
injunctive standard), with eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (describing the traditional four-part test for 
granting injunctive relief). 
328. Accordingly, the Washington State Supreme Court should also clarify that the dicta in 
PAWS was not meant to bring public records requests into the realm of trade secret 
misappropriation. 
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result from such disclosure. If trade secrets are disclosed, the harm to the 
trade secret holder is guaranteed and the only parties that benefit are 
their competitors. Businesses already submit the majority of public 
records requests,329 presumably to try to expose their competitors’ trade 
secrets and destroy their competitive advantage. This is not the purpose 
of public records acts330 and that practice should be curtailed. After all, 
the motive behind a public records request should matter. Public records 
requests could provide valuable information, from exposing fraud to 
discovering poor contracting choices. Requesting records for these 
purposes should be allowed. Requests simply to gain an advantage over 
a business competitor should not. The PRA, by providing an injunction 
standard that weighs the potential harm to businesses with the value of 
government transparency, solves this problem in a way that works for all 
parties. This injunctive standard would ensure that a public records 
request in which a trade secret could be disclosed is capably and 
extensively evaluated, protecting businesses while still considering the 
government’s interest in disclosure. This would protect businesses, cut 
down on the practice of “fishing” for trade secrets through public 
records requests, increase businesses’ confidence while working with the 
government, and resolve some of the current ambiguity within the 
statute; all while also maintaining the value of government transparency. 
Accordingly, the Washington State Supreme Court should expressly 
hold that submitting a public records request to obtain a trade secret 
triggers only one injunctive standard,331 the PRA standard, and not the 
UTSA standard. 
B. Current Proposals for Changes to the Trade Secret Exemption 
1. The Sunshine Committee 
The legislative committee that is responsible for reviewing and 
updating the exemptions to the PRA is saddled with the unwieldy title of 
the “Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee.”332 This 
title is commonly disregarded for the more whimsical moniker of the 
                                                     
329. See discussion supra Introduction. 
330. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (referencing that the purpose of the PRA is so the people 
can “remain[] informed so that they may maintain control over the [government] instruments that 
they have created”). 
331. This also has the added value of maintaining conformity and simplicity within the PRA, by 
not requiring courts to navigate different injunctive standards. 
332. Sunshine Committee, supra note 222.  
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“Sunshine Committee”.333 This committee was established in 2007, at 
the request of the Washington State Attorney General’s office.334 The 
legislature passed Substitute Senate Bill 5435,335 and the Sunshine 
Committee was codified in the PRA as section 140.336 The Sunshine 
Committee consists of thirteen committee members337 appointed from 
various bodies of the legislature,338 the executive,339 and the public.340 
Among these members must be representatives of the governor,341 local 
government,342 the Attorney General,343 and “a statewide media 
association.”344 These members serve four-year terms.345 Once a year, 
the Sunshine Committee must provide recommendations about whether 
to continue an exemption without modification, to modify the 
exemption, to schedule the exemption for “sunset review” at a future 
date, or to terminate the exemption.346 
The Sunshine Committee submitted its 2016 recommendations to the 
Legislature on November 15th, 2016.347 The Sunshine Committee 
proposed five substantial amendments to PRA exemptions, two of which 
involved trade secrets.348 The first amendment relating to trade secrets 
moved some clarifying language around in RCW 42.56.270(11).349 
The second recommended amendment is more substantial.350 The 
recommendation establishes a procedural requirement.351 Only 
proprietary information that is marked confidential and comes with a 
summarized explanation of the expected harm that would result from 
                                                     
333. Id. 
334. Id. 
335. S.S.B. 5435, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007). 
336. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.140 (2016). 
337. Id. § 42.56.140(1)(a). 
338. Id. § 42.56.140(1)(a)(iv)–(v). 
339. Id. § 42.56.140(1)(a)(i). 
340. Id. § 42.56.140(1)(a)(vi). 
341. Id. § 42.56.140(1)(a)(i). 
342. Id. 
343. Id. § 42.56.140(1)(a)(ii). 
344. Id. 
345. Id. § 42.56.140(1)(a)(vi)(c). 
346. Id.  § 42.56.140(7)(a), (d). 
347. See PUB. RECORDS EXEMPTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., supra note 36. 
348. Id. at 5. 
349. Id. at 8 (moving some information relating to the Department of Social and Health Services 
from the bottom of the section to the top). 
350. See generally id. at 10 (laying out more changes to section 270). 
351. Id. 
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disclosure is exempt.352 The new language also prevents disclosure of 
trade secret information if the agency decides that disclosing the 
information would result in “public or private loss or unfair private 
gain.”353 The recommendation also allows a defendant opposing an 
injunction on disclosure of proprietary information to recover attorney’s 
fees, “to the extent that the defendant prevailed in opposing [the] 
injunction.”354 However, perhaps most importantly, the Sunshine 
Committee recommended that a new subsection be added to section 270 
creating a specific exemption for trade secrets.355 The addition of this 
subsection would make section 270 read, “[t]he following financial, 
commercial, and proprietary information is exempt from disclosure 
under this chapter . . . [t]rade secrets as defined in RCW 
19.108.010(4).”356 This proposed cross-reference was added “to assist 
public agencies, private entities providing records to public agencies, 
and records requestors in recognizing that the trade secrets law may 
exempt any such records requested under the PRA.”357 
On January 12, 2017, House Bill 1160 was introduced in the 
Washington State House of Representatives.358 The Bill substantially 
adopts all of the Sunshine Committee’s suggestions.359 It passed the 
House on February 15, completely unopposed.360 The Bill was then 
introduced in the Senate on February 16, where it remains pending a 
final vote.361 
                                                     
352. Id. (adding “PROVIDED, that the information is clearly marked as confidential and 
accompanied by a particularized explanation of expected harm from disclosure at the time of 
submission . . .” to the beginning of section 270). 
353. Id. (continuing the addition to section 270 with “or the agency determines that disclosure of 




357. Id. at 4. 
358. HB 1160 - 2017–18: Enacting Recommendations of the Sunshine Committee, WASH. ST. 
LEGIS., http://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?Year=2017&BillNumber=1160#billhistorytitle [https:// 
perma.cc/J495-J8RV] [hereinafter HB 1160, Bill History]. 
359. See S.H.B. 1160, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017). The primary difference between the 
new bill and the Sunshine Committee’s proposals is that the new bill changes the subsection 
designations from a numerical ordering to an alphabetical system. Id. at 5–9. Thus, the new 
subsection discussing trade secrets becomes WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270(1)(bb) instead of 
§ 42.56.270(24). Id. at 9. The new subsection is also the last subsection of § 42.56.270(1), instead of 
being placed in the middle. Id. 
360. HB 1160, Bill History, supra note 358. 
361. Id.  
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2. The Washington Legislature Should Not Adopt the Sunshine 
Committee’s Suggestion Because It Does Not Resolve the 
Ambiguity in the Statute 
The Washington State Legislature could follow the proposal 
submitted by the Sunshine Committee, which adds a subsection that 
would specifically exempt trade secrets. However, this proposal does not 
resolve the current confusion in the statute. Therefore, the Washington 
Legislature should not adopt the Sunshine Committee’s suggestions to 
amend the trade secret exemption. 
a. The Ambiguity in the Statute Makes It Difficult for Businesses to 
Protect Their Trade Secrets 
The confusing structure of the PRA makes it difficult for businesses 
to know how to protect their trade secrets, or even to understand that 
they can protect them. The obscure “other statute” language is not 
helpful. A small business cannot be expected to know that this two-word 
clause protects their trade secrets. RCW 42.56.270 provides added 
uncertainty by introducing twenty-eight examples of exempt situations, 
all of which could constitute trade secret information and three of which 
explicitly do.362 This extra provision seems redundant at best and 
confusing at worst. If all trade secrets are exempted, a provision that 
provides examples of exempted trade secrets is not necessary. If the 
reason RCW 42.56.270—and its examples of exemptions363—exists is to 
provide clarity about the trade secret exemption, then it is unclear why 
the trade secret exemption is not more clearly identified. 
For an example of the effect of this uncertainty, one need not look 
further than the Robbins Geller case. The Court in Robbins Geller held 
that the information at issue was not a trade secret under the UTSA, thus 
barring the law firm from using the “other statute” exemption.364 
However, the Court also held that the law firm could use the exemptions 
in RCW 42.56.270 to try to protect their information.365 This implies that 
RCW 42.56.270 is somehow broader than the trade secret exemption 
embodied in the “other statute” language. In other words, RCW 
42.56.270 covers more information than trade secrets. But, if that is the 
                                                     
362. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270 (2016). 
363. One of which is a remnant from before the “other statute” language existed and is four 
decades old. 1972 VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 181, at 63. 
364. Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd, LLP v. State, 179 Wash. App. 711, 721–26, 328 P.3d 
905, 911–13 (2014). 
365. Id. at 727–28, 328 P.3d at 913–14. 
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case, explicitly mentioning trade secrets in RCW 42.56.270 and 
describing other trade secret-like information obscures that goal of 
covering more information than just trade secrets. Moreover, even the 
PAWS case, perhaps the most significant case in PRA jurisprudence, 
seemed unclear on the role of RCW 42.56.270 as it related to trade 
secrets. PAWS talked about both the “other statute” and the RCW 
42.56.270 exemption in the context of trade secrets and with trade 
secret-like language.366 If RCW 42.56.270 has a wider reach than the 
“other statute” trade secret exemption, giving it intellectual property and 
trade secret connotations will obscure that purpose. Even setting aside 
the express trade secret language in sub-sections 270(11), (16), and (28), 
the statute still seems to be framed around trade secrets,367 which is 
ambiguous if the real purpose is to exempt a broader category of 
information than just trade secrets. Having a single, clear, and generic 
trade secret exemption seems much simpler than the current 
entanglement. 
Furthermore, understanding the procedure for preventing disclosure 
through a public records request is incredibly important. Businesses that 
submit information to a government agency have to know how to make 
use of the trade secret exemptions in the PRA in order to safeguard their 
trade secrets. They need to know how to communicate with the relevant 
office, obtain an injunction when the public records request goes 
through, mark relevant portions as proprietary, and other facets of the 
process. Any business that is not a successful law firm might, 
understandably, not know how to navigate all the ins and outs of 
preventing disclosure (and even then, as in the case of Robbins Geller, it 
still might not be enough). Being uninformed of the trade secret 
exemption and how it functions is a particularly relevant problem for 
small businesses that may not have an in-house counsel or be able to 
afford outside legal assistance. Furthermore, the structure and ease (or 
lack thereof) of the disclosure process has implications for how strong 
trade secret protection is. The harder it is to sue to protect trade secrets, 
the weaker trade secret protection is because fewer businesses will 
bother to go through the process. In addition, how the legislature 
projects the process to the business community determines how that 
community views the incentives to sue to protect its trade secrets. A 
small business that sees a complicated legal process may decide to 
                                                     
366. See supra notes 271 and 274. 
367. See WASH. REV. CODE. § 42.56.270 (listing twenty-five other examples (beyond (11), (16), 
and (28)) that all could qualify as trade secrets under the UTSA definition). 
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forego the process all together and end up losing its trade secrets as a 
result. 
In addition, this current statutory framework is confusing for the 
agency workers that work with this trade secret information. They need 
to know when something is exempt from disclosure. It makes their job 
much more difficult to have to decide on their own whether information 
is protected from disclosure. Thus, it is important to have an easily 
accessible and clear process that also is sufficiently stringent to provide 
adequate protection. 
b. The Proposed Subsection Would Not Resolve the Ambiguity in the 
Statute 
Adopting the Sunshine Committee’s proposal would not help to 
clarify the statute, would not resolve the injunction issue, would not 
achieve the stated goal of the proposal—helping to inform small 
businesses about trade secret exemption—and might cause more 
problems. First, adopting this provision does not solve the ambiguity 
generated by having the trade secret exemption seemingly embodied in 
two different sections of the PRA.368 If this provision was enacted it 
would provide for an explicit trade secret exemption within the 
“financial, commercial and proprietary information” section.369 This 
solution does not address the existence of the trade secret exemption 
triggered by the “other statute” language in another section of the 
PRA.370 If anything, it exacerbates the problems with RCW 42.56.270. It 
does not clarify whether RCW 42.56.270 has a broader scope than the 
“other statute” exemption, or even indicate that the two are different. So, 
the current framework would continue, without any clarification. 
Second, the Sunshine Committee’s proposal does nothing to address 
the problem of two injunctive standards, with no clear guidance 
indicating when and to which provisions they apply. The proposal may 
even confound the problem more. The wording of the proposal exempts 
trade secrets as defined by the UTSA.371 By referencing the UTSA, the 
proposal raises the same questions as before and expands the uncertainty 
to RCW 42.56.270. With the proposal’s language, the UTSA’s 
                                                     
368. See supra sections III.C.1–2. 
369. See PUB. RECORDS EXEMPTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., supra note 36, at 10. 
370. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1); Progressive Animal Welfare Soc. v. Univ. of Wash., 
125 Wash. 2d 243, 262, 884 P.2d 592, 603 (1994) (noting that the UTSA qualifies as an “other 
statute[]”). 
371. PUB. RECORDS EXEMPTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., supra note 36, at 10. 
08 - Delaney.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/18/2017 9:02 AM 
1948 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1905 
 
injunctive standard could apply to the new section or could apply to the 
entirety of RCW 42.56.270. The result being that the PRA standard is 
not supplanted nor is its role clarified. Thus, both standards could apply 
simultaneously to both the “other statute” and to RCW 42.56.270. 
Third, beyond problems with the new trade secret exemption to RCW 
42.56.270, the proposal also adds a problematic requirement: that 
proprietary information must be marked confidential and include an 
accompanying explanation to be exempt.372 By identifying information 
as exempt up front, this requirement might seem like a way to simplify 
the process. The public records officer can evaluate the exemption claim 
and make a decision without getting a court involved. However, a court 
would still likely have to be involved because if the public records 
officer decides that the information is not exempted, the interested party 
will likely challenge that decision in court. Furthermore, this 
requirement does not take into account the case of the person who does 
not know to mark their information confidential or who simply forgets. 
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, marking documents or other 
media containing trade secrets confidential is not a requirement for 
maintaining secrecy.373 The only requirement is that the trade secret 
holder take “reasonable measures” to protect secrecy.374 There are no set 
requirements that define “reasonable measures,” only a few examples 
that courts will commonly look at.375 This marking requirement is not 
usual. By obligating businesses to mark the information they submit to 
the government, the Sunshine Committee is mandating a requirement for 
secrecy that trade secret law does not include. In fact, transactions like 
the ones at issues here—“disclosing [trade secrets] on a confidential 
basis for evaluation”—are considered to be protected use and do not 
require any additional measures for secrecy than those which would 
normally constitute “reasonable measures.”376 Not only is the Sunshine 
Committee requiring an unnecessary and abnormal measure for secrecy 
but the marking requirement also creates an additional hardship for small 
businesses, the very community that the Sunshine Committee is 
attempting to assist. For a small business, the time spent making sure all 
their information is properly marked as confidential is time that the 
business is not spending on their innovation. The business will have to 
                                                     
372. Id. 
373. MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 39, § 1.04. 
374. Id. 
375. Id. These examples are by no means exhaustive. 
376. Id. 
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worry about every little thing, ensuring that everything that could be a 
trade secret is properly marked. In addition, if the business decides to 
play it safe and simply mark everything as confidential, they run the risk 
of the government—or courts for that matter—failing to take the 
markings seriously. After all, not everything that is disclosed can be a 
trade secret, even if it is marked confidential. This marking requirement 
might actually get in the way of innovation. An individual or business 
should not run the risk of forfeiting all or even some protection for his or 
her trade secret information because of this unusual rule. 
Finally, placing the language specifically exempting trade secrets as 
the last provision in an already ambiguous provision will not help 
potential vendors “recogniz[e] that the trade secrets law may exempt any 
such records requested under the PRA.”377 The section of the PRA 
dealing with “financial, commercial and proprietary information” 
already includes twenty-seven subsections.378 Most, if not all, of them 
could be interpreted as trade secrets under the UTSA’s broad definition 
as adopted by Washington State.379 Additionally, the proposed 
subsection is marked as subsection twenty-four.380 This location has the 
dual nature of being toward the bottom of the section and yet still buried 
within the main text.381 It is unlikely that potential vendors will be able 
to find this new subsection within the long and confusing “financial, 
commercial and proprietary information” section. Small businesses, 
which the procurement system is supposed to encourage,382 will have a 
particularly difficult time. Reading a long and complex statute, all of 
which may or may not encompass trade secrets, is not a top priority for 
small businesses. These businesses likely lack the legal resources to 
spend on combing the Washington statutes for a six-word383 exemption 
for trade secrets. Burying this provision does not accomplish the stated 
goal of helping potential bidders for government contracts understand 
that their trade secret information is exempted from PRA requests, 
especially if the potential bidder is a small business. Therefore, 
following the Sunshine Committee’s advice and adding a “trade secret” 
provision at the end of the provision on “financial, commercial and 
                                                     
377. PUB. RECORDS EXEMPTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., supra note 36, at 5. 
378. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270 (2016). 
379. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.108.010(4) (2016) (UTSA definition of trade secret). 
380. PUB. RECORDS EXEMPTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., supra note 36, at 10. 
381. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270; cf. PUB. RECORDS EXEMPTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY 
COMM., supra note 36, at 10. 
382. See WASH. REV. CODE § 39.26.005 (2016). 
383. See PUB. RECORDS EXEMPTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., supra note 36, at 10. 
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proprietary information”384 would not necessarily solve the problems 
with the existing statute and might complicate things even more. 
3. Instead, the Washington Legislature Should Make Two Changes 
The first change should be to change the title of the “financial, 
commercial and proprietary information” section of the PRA to “Trade 
Secret Information and Financial, Commercial and Proprietary 
Information.” The Sunshine Committee was right to recognize that the 
location of the trade secret exemption within the PRA’s framework is 
ambiguous and thus makes it difficult for potential bidders on 
government contracts to know that their trade secrets are protected from 
public records requests. However, the proposed solution does not clarify 
the statute or assist potential vendors as much as is needed. Therefore, 
the amendment to the PRA should go one step further and simply 
rename the section on “financial, commercial and proprietary 
information” as the “Trade Secret Information” section. The proposed 
renaming of the statutory provision would look like this: 
 
42.56.270. Trade Secret Information and Financial, Commercial 
and Proprietary Information 
 
The following trade secret information and financial, 
commercial, and proprietary information is exempt from 
disclosure under this chapter: 
 
(1) Valuable, formulae, designs, drawings . . . etc. 
 
First, renaming the section serves the main goal of helping vendors 
realize that their valuable trade secrets are protected from disclosure 
through public records requests. Putting the information that trade 
secrets are exempted up front and clearly labeled helps potential bidders 
for government contracts realize that their trade secrets are exempted. 
They will not have to dig through case law or muddle through a long and 
complex statute. This re-naming will particularly help small businesses. 
Just by looking at the title of the section, a small business owner can 
understand that his or her trade secret information is protected.385 
                                                     
384. Id. 
385. While this is a legal solution to the problem, it does not have to be the only solution. There is 
more than one way to achieve the goal of informing businesses that trade secrets are exempt. For 
example, DES (and every agency) could have a page on their website announcing that trade secrets 
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Second, the proposed renaming clears up the ambiguity with the 
“other statute” language. With a clearly labeled “trade secret” section to 
the PRA the “other statute” section will not be necessary. The “other 
statute” language can be used for the other exemptions that are not 
expressly required, as was intended. Moreover, the holding in PAWS, 
qualifying the UTSA as an “other statute”, was at best ill-considered and 
at worst wrong.386 It raises the question of whether Washington’s trade 
secret exemption should rest on a case that, at the very least, did not 
fully consider the issue.387 Given the dubious reasoning of the PAWS 
Court when invoking the “other statute” exemption it makes more sense 
to dispense with the “other statute” exemption all together. In short, 
simply re-naming the section, instead of burying the “trade secret” 
language, keeps all the benefits provided by the Sunshine Committee’s 
suggestion while eliminating its drawbacks. In fact, renaming the 
provision would also provide an opportunity to consolidate the section. 
Most, if not all, of the current twenty-eight provisions could qualify 
under the definition of trade secrets. Those subsections, which were 
added over many years, could be safely deleted. If there are concerns 
about deleting the “financial, commercial and proprietary information” 
language completely, it can still be included in the title. This change 
would resemble the way the FOIA exemption works and would leave 
room for a trade secret category and a broader “financial, commercial, 
and proprietary” category, which would also align with the implications 
from the Robbins Geller case. As Washington begins to move into new 
areas of technology, the method for protecting trade secrets should be 
updated. The federal government has been procuring more sophisticated 
trade secret information for longer than the Washington State 
government has. As a result, there is more robust federal case law 
surrounding trade secret exemption and subsequently more guidance. 
This case law could provide a sound basis to help Washington improve 
its own methods for dealing with procurement and for protecting the 
businesses that it works with. Explicitly mentioning that trade secrets are 
exempted up front will allow businesses to understand that their trade 
secret information is exempt and accomplish the goals the Sunshine 
Committee articulated. 
The second change should be to the Sunshine Committee itself. 
Currently, the only express group—outside of the government—
                                                     
are exempted, explaining what a trade secret is, and detailing the process for protecting trade secrets 
from disclosure. 
386. See discussion supra section III.C.3. 
387. See id. (discussing the Court’s brief analysis). 
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represented on the Sunshine Committee is the media.388 This reflects a 
view of the PRA from an early age, when freedom of the press was one 
of the only concerns implicated by government disclosure.389 
Government disclosure has expanded390 and more interests should be 
represented on the Sunshine Committee. Therefore, the State Legislature 
should mandate that at least one member of the Sunshine Committee 
should come from the business community. Such a provision would 
ensure that at least one member of the business community would 
understand trade secrets and could provide another perspective on their 
disclosure.391 
CONCLUSION 
Public records requests provide a unique danger to businesses that 
submit information to the government. Such a request could potentially 
destroy their trade secrets, an outcome that could be devastating. The 
general exemption in the Washington State Public Records Act provides 
some protection against this. However, the current statutory scheme is 
confusing and ambiguous due to the discrete location of the current 
exemption and the presence of a similar, but incredibly ambiguous, 
“financial, commercial and proprietary information” provision. The 
Sunshine Committee has proposed a potential solution. While a step in 
the right direction, burying a new twenty-fourth subsection in said 
“financial, commercial and proprietary information” provision for trade 
secrets does not resolve the problem. But, renaming that provision to 
make it explicitly about trade secrets will solve the problem. Changing 
this language will clear up the ambiguity in the provision and make it 
more obvious that trade secrets are exempted, thus accomplishing the 
stated goal of the Sunshine Committee to make businesses aware that 
their trade secrets are protected from disclosure by a public records 
request. In addition, the courts should clarify that the PRA injunctive 
standard is the gauge that applies in the trade secret context. 
Furthermore, the State Legislature should add a member to the Sunshine 
Committee that represents the business community. This addition will 
provide a perspective that the Sunshine Committee needs to pay 
                                                     
388. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.140(1)(a)(ii) (2016). 
389. See, e.g., STAHL & KILLEEN, supra note 214. 
390. See discussion supra Introduction. 
391. Granted, the Sunshine Committee’s role is to evaluate all of the exemptions to the PRA, not 
just the trade secret exemption. However, more than one exemption will be relevant to the business 
community and having this perspective will provide insight on many future problems that arise.  
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attention to, while also reflecting the expanded nature of government 
disclosure. 
House Bill 1160 provides the perfect time for the legislature to revisit 
an important part of the law. The PRA has come a long way from the 
voter initiative that only had ten exemptions forty years ago. Now, with 
more than 500 exemptions, the PRA has become unwieldy and, at least 
in the trade secret context, unworkable for small business owners and 
potentially for practicing lawyers and courts. This is an opportunity for 
the legislature to evaluate the purpose and effect of the PRA, to consider 
whether the right lines are still being drawn, to examine other models,392 
and to continue the work that was started with the 2006 recodification. 
This is an opportunity to clean up the PRA, make it a more workable 
open government act, and help some people in the process. 
 
                                                     
392. It seems that FOIA’s trade secret exemption might be a good model for the revised PRA. It 
combines trade secrets with a broader catchall category. This appears to be what the PRA is trying 
to accomplish. The Court in Progressive Animal Welfare Society v. University of Washington, 125 
Wash. 2d 243, 266, 884 P.2d 592, 605 (1994), noted that the PRA “closely parallels” FOIA, but it 
cannot parallel FOIA too closely as the fundamental basis of the two acts was so different—voter 
initiative versus congressional bill. The legislature should consider whether FOIA is a good model 
and, if it is, it should consider how closely the PRA should mimic the FOIA model. 
